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Abstract
A study was performed to Investigate the construct

validity of the Interpersonal Maturity Level (I-Level)

Classification System, presently used vjidely with juvenile
offenders.

The theory was validated for the constructs

of cognitive complexity, Impulse control, and foresight

or ability to plan behavior, but not for the constructs
of locus of control and internalized guilt.

Of the

variables studied, cognitive complexity, as measured by
Hunt's Paragraph Completion method, was shown to be the
best single predictor of I-level classification.

A

highly sig;nlficant positive relationship was found between
I-level and verbal and non-verbal intelligence (r = ,5S
and r = .53. respectively).

However, when the effects

due to intelligence across groups were controlled,
the relationships found significant in the principal tests
of the hypotheses continued to be significant.

Results

were discussed in terms of the measures used, the

theoretical implications for I-level as an example of a
theory based on the cognitive-developmental approach to
socialization, and some practical implications for the
use of alternate measures of I-level classification.

Suggested directions for further research were specified.
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Chapter

I

INTRODUCTION

A method of classification currently In use In clinical practice, particularly viith populations of juvenile

offenders, Is the Interpersonal Maturity Level (I-level)

Classification System.

As originally formulated by Sullivan,

Grant, and Grant (1957), I-level is presented both as a

theory of personality development with specific application
to delinquent behavior and as a clinical tool.

The system

is not then solely a model for diagnosing youthful offenders
and placing them into various I-level categories, but it is

also a method for identifying and selecting youths for

clearly prescribed differential modes of treatment, based

upon the presumably different needs of children at different
levels in the system.

Providing a composite of diagnostic

categories and procedures, treatment modalities and prescriptions, this conceptualization purports to offer an evolving,

practical intervention program for delinquency control and

individual growth.
I-level has continued to gain in popularity over the
past fifteen years and more recently has been Implemented

for use in correctional systems in various state divisions
of youth services.

At the present time, it appears that

this approach "stands as a leading candidate to become the

dominant one in differential treatment (Gibbons, 1970,

p.

23)."

Despite Its acclaim and its application
in the treatment of
literally thousands of juvenile offenders,
however, the I-

level typolosy has not yet been subjected
to the kind of
ongoing critical analysis which is necessary
and expected
of a new psychosocial theoretical formulation.
The theoretical conceptualization on which the I-level
typology is based
is not explicitly grounded in previously
existing theories
of personality development, although elements
of the work
of Piaget. Erikson. G. H. Mead, and H. S. Sullivan
are

evident.

Thus, as is frequently the situation with new

theoretical approaches to personality theory, there is no
way to systematically assess its validity in terms of existing

evidence related to these or other formulations.

In this

instance, alternative indicators of construct validity must
be Investigated (Becker and Heyman. 1971).

Research pertaining to the I-level approach to classification, however, has been almost exclusively directed toward

assessing the predictive validity of I-level theory, i.e.,
for predicting the utility of I-level classification as a

means of assignment to different modes of treatment.

The

emphasis, then, has been on outcome studies predicting such

factors as lox^er recidivism rates, psychological test-score
changes, etc., as a result of I-level classification and con-

comitant differential treatment strategies.

Questions related

to the construct validity of I-level theory have essentially

been ignored,
r4ore

specifically, the I-level classification system is

based upon an intensive clinical interview which focuses

primarily upon interpersonal relationships, and presumes
theoretically to encompass certain specific behavioral
dispositions.

For example, it is presmed that there are

significant predictable differences betv/een youths at variou
levels in terms of their power orientations, cognitive complexity, internalization of standards, impulse control,

and foreslghtf ulness, yet very few studies are available

which empirically test those theoretical premises.

The

purpose of the present study, then. Is to Investigate
certain premises and behavioral correlates germane to this

classification system, many of which lend themselves readily
to measurement, in an attempt to assess the construct

validity of I-level theory.

Chapter II
REVIEW OF LITEPiATUHS

The Cop:nltlve-Develor)inental Approach to Socialization

Theories of psychological development have traditionally
placed a heavy emphasis on the process of socialization in
the ongoing growth of individuals.

While these theories

are many and varied, it is possible to characterize them
as representing one of three basic approaches to development:

maturational, environmental, or cognitive-developmental.

Maturatlonal theories of development, such as those
of Gesell (195^) and Lorenz (I965), stress an innate pattern-

ing which exists in the organism from birth, and in dealing

with developmental changes have emphasized the idea of un-

folding maturational stages which guide the development of
the child.

Environmental or learning theories of develop-

ment often allow for genetic factors in personality (Hull,
19^3)

"but

stress the importance of patterns of events in the

environment (stimulus contingencies), and assume that the
basic structures of complex responses are reflections of

structures existing outside the child, given by the social
and physical world (Skinner, 1953).

Given these two rather

extreme positions, cognitive-developmental theories are

"interactional" in that they assume that basic mental
structure is the product of the patterning of the interaction

between the organism and the environment, rather than

5

directly reflecting either innate patterns
in the organism
or patterns of events in the environment.
Each of these three approaches makes different sets
of
assumptions and involves varying constructs. As stated

previously, the present study will be concerned with the

constructs central to a specific developmental theory, the

Interpersonal Maturity Level Classification system of
Sullivan, Grant, and Grant.

Since this theory is a theory

of socialization in the context of the cognitive-develop-

mental approach, a more detailed explanation of the assumptions

Underlying this approach to development will be first
presented as background and a context for later description
of the Interpersonal Maturity system.

This description of

the cognitive-developmental approach will draw heavily upon

Kohlberg (1969b), who has summarized in an effective,
coherent way an extensive body of related literature that
is not always easy to understand.

The term "cognitive-developmental" refers to a set of

assumptions and approaches to research which are common to
several theories of social and cognitive development.

Representative of these various theories are the formulations
of Baldwin (I906), Dewey (1930), Mead (193^). Plaget (19^8),

Sullivan, Grant, and Grant (1957), Loevinger (I966), and

Kohlberg (1969a)

According to Kohlberg (1969b), cognitive-developmental
theories share the following basic assumptions:
1)

Basic development involves basic transformations

of cognitive structure .

It is not possible to define or

6

explain these transformations by the parameters of
associationistic learning (contiguity, repetition, reinforcement,
etc.), but rather they must be explained by parameters
of

organizational wholes or systems of internal relations.
2)

Development of cognitive structure is the result

of processes of interaction between the structure of the

organism and the structure of the environment.

This develop-

ment, then, is not directly maturational nor is it the

direct result of learning (in the sense of a direct shaping
of the organism's response to agree with environmental

structures)
3)

of action

Cognitive structures are always defined as structures
;

that is, the organization of various modes of

responding is always an organization of actions upon objects.
4)

The direction of development of cognitive structure

is toward greater equilibrium in the interaction of the

organism and the environment; in other words, of movement
toward a greater balance or reciprocity between the action
of the organism upon the perceived object or situation and

the action of the perceived object upon the organism.

Kohlberg

notes that this balance is reflected in the underlying
stability (conservation) of a cognitive act v^hich is under-

going apparent transformation, with corresponding development
then being representative of a broadened system of trans-

formations maintaining such conservation or stability.
These first four assumptions are assumptions which hold

for the development of ways of thinking about both physical

7

and social objects, i.e. for cognitive development
in general.
However, in order to make more concrete their
application
to social development, some additional related
assmptions

pertaining to social-emotional development are necessary.
B'our

further assumptions, then, are:
5)

Affective development and functioning on the one

hand, and cognitive development and functioning on the other,

are not distinct and separate entities.
and "cognitive" development are parallel

Rather, "affective"
,

merely representing

different contexts and perspectives in defining structural
change
6)

Following up on the first assumption regarding the

explanation of basic development in terms of parameters of
organizational v^holes or systems of internal relations,

cognitive-developmental theorists (see especially Loevinger,
1966)

emphasize the existence of a fundamental unity of

personality organization and development knoxm as the ego,
or the self.

V/hile there are various aspects of social

development (moral development, psychosexual development,
intellectual development, etc.), these aspects are united by

their common reference to a single concept of self in a
single social world (Sullivan, Grant, and Grant, 1957).

Cognitive-developmental theorists further state that social

development is, in essence, the restructuring of the
a)

concept of self,

other people,

c)

b)

in its relationship to concepts of

conceived as being in a common social xwrld

with social standards (Kohlberg. 1969b).

Also, in addition

8

to the unity of level of social development due to general

cognitive development (what is known as the g factor in
mental maturity kinds of tests), there is said to be a

further unity of development due to a common factor of
ego maturity (Loevinger, I966)
7)

Social cognition always involves role- taking

in

;

other vjords, an ax>jareness that the other person is in some
way similar to the self, and that the other

knox-^s

or is

responsive to the self in a system where expectations are
complementary.

In this sense developmental changes in the

social self reflect parallel changes in conceptions of the
social world,
8)

The direction of social or ego development is also

movement toward an equilibrium or reciprocity (as in assumption number four) betvjeen the self's actions and those of
others toward the self (e.g., as In principles of justice

which are conceived in terms of reciprocity or equality, or
relationships of "love," i.e., reciprocal Intimacy).
Some definitions and elaborations are necessary at this
point.

As noted, cognitive-developmental theories presuppose

distinctions between behavior changes or learning in general
and changes in mental structure .

Structure, in this sense,

refers to the general characteristics of shape, pattern, or

organization of response rather than to the rate or intensity
of response or its pairing with particular stimuli.

Cognitive

structure refers to rules for processing information or for

connecting (Integrating in Sullivan, Grant, and Grant's

system) experienced events.

Cognition (as most clearly

evident in thinking) means putting things
together or
relating events, and this connecting or
Integrating is an
active connecting process, not a passive
connecting of events
through external association and repetition.
This means,
to a large extent, that the process of
relating particular
events depends upon prior general modes of
relating

developed by the organism.

Cognitive theorists term the

most general m-odes of relating objects "categories
of
experience" which include the relations of causality,
sub-

stantiality, space, time, quantity and logic (Kohlberg,
1969b)

To back up a little, one of the basic cognitive-

developmental assumptions (number two. above) is that mental
structure Is the result of an interaction between certain

organlsmic structuring tendencies and the structure of the

outside world.

This interaction of organism and environment

leads to the concept of cognitive stages .

In other words,

this interaction leads to cognitive stages which represent

the transformations of simple early cognitive structures
as these are applied to (or assimilate) the external world,

and as they are accomodated to or restructured by the

external world in the course of being applied to it.

And

actually the core of the cognitive-developmental position
is this tenet of cognitive stages.

Plaget (i960) has outlined the following general

characteristics of cognitive stages (adapted from Kohlberg,
1969b)
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stages Imply distinct or qualitative
differences
in persons' modes of thinking or of solving
the same
1.

problems at different ages.
2.

These different modes of thought form an invariant

seouence, order or succession in individual development.
It is said, for example, that cultural and environmental

factors or innate capabilities may make one child or

group of children reach a given level of development
at a much earlier point of time than another child

All children, however, should still go through the same

order of steps or levels, regardless of environmental

teaching or lack of teaching.

In other words, while

cultural factors may speed up, slow dom, or stop development, they do not change its sequence.

Piaget states

that there is an irjner logic that determines this

sequence, and continues by claiming that in determining
a person's current behavior, this inner logic of

development is as important as his history or his
heredity or his environment.

Jane Loevinger agrees

with Piaget and adds that the inner logic of development becomes a compelling conviction to those working
in the area:

"Because there is an inner logic

not yet full verbalized

— experienced,

— one

intuitive

clinicians usually grasp the schema quickly (Loevinger,
1966, p. 201)."

Each of these different and sequential
modes
of thought forms a "structu^ied whole."
A given stage3.

response on a task is not just representative
of a
specific response determined by knowledge and
familiarity
with that task or even with tasks similar to it.
Instead
it represents an underlying thought-organization,
e.g.,

"the level of concrete operations," which determines

responses to tasks vMch are not obviously similar.

According to riaget, at the stage of concrete operations,
the child has a general tendency to believe that a

physical object conserves its properties on various

physical dimensions in spite of apparent perceptual
changes.

Piaget and other cognitive-developmental

theorists insist that this tendency is structural; it
is not a specific belief about a specific object.

^.

Cognitive stages are hierarc hial integrations,

i.e., stages form an order of increasingly differ-

entiated and integrated structures to fulfill a

common function, maintenajice of an equilibrium between
the organism and the environment.

Higher stages re-

integrate the structures found at lower stages.

For

example, formal operational thought in the Piagetian

sense includes all the structural features of concrete

operational thought but at a new level of organization.
Concrete operational thought does not disappear when
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formal thoup-ht develops, but rather continues to
be used
in concrete situations x^here it is adequate or
when

attempts at solution by fomal thoup;ht have not worked.
However, as Kohlberg points out, there is a hierarchical

preference within each individual; in other

vjords,

a

disposition to prefer to solve a problem at the highest
level available to her or him.

One further point before moving on to the next section
xvhlch may be helpful in clarifying: the nature of the coc:niti\

developmental approach, is that this approach is not a
theory about the process by which all behavior chanr:e
occurs,

as, for

instance, "learning theories" are.

it is a prc^ram. of sjialysis.

Rather,

As Kohlberg notes, "some

behavior changes are 'structural' and 'directed' as
evidenced by proceeding through sequential stages, while

other behavior changes are not (Kohlberg, I969 b,
In other words, behavior changes

x^^hich

p.

360)."

appear to be

progressive and Irreversible require a different kind of
analysis than do behavior changes which are reversible
and sitiiationally specif Ic In nature.

It Is to these

kinds of irreversible changes that I-level theory

addresses itself.
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The Interpersonal Maturity Level (I-level)
Classification System

An example of a cognitive-developmental approach to
socialization is the Interpersonal Maturity Level (I-level)

Classification System originally presented by Sullivan,
Grant, and Grant in 1957.

The first application of the

theory began in the 1950 's with a study of military offenders
(Grant and Grant, 1959).

A major elaboration of I-level

theory occurred in I96O-I96I with the beginnings of the

Community Treatment Project (OTP) (Grant, I96I)

,

and the

theory has since been revised and expanded during the years
of experimentation in the CTP (warren, I966).

The CTP is

a program for treatment of juvenile offenders in the

California Youth Authority.

V/hile I-level as an approach to

treating juvenile offenders has been primarily utilized in
the California Youth Authority, the system is currently

being implemented by the Division of Youth Services in the
State of Colorado, while at the same time Nevada, Utah,
Illinois, New York, Vv'isconsin, and Oregon are making some

limited use of the approach,
I-level theory, in its original formulation, described
a sequence of personality (or character) integrations in

normal personality development.

The system focuses upon

the ways in which the individual is able to see himself and

the world, and the ways he is able to interpret what is

happening between himself and others, as well as among
others.

According to the theory, seven successive stages

of interpersonal maturity characterize psychological

development, ranging from the least mature
(which resembles
the Interpersonal reactions of a newborn
infant),
to an

Ideal of social m.aturity which it is said
is seldom or
never reached in our present culture (Warren,
1970).

Each

of the seven stages, or levels, is defined by
a crucial

interpersonal problem which must be solved before further
progress toward maturity can occur.

All persons do not

necessarily work their way through each stage, but may
possibly become fixated at a particular level (Warren, I969)
It is stressed that interpersonal development is viewed as

a continuum.

It should be noted here that stages of

development are the primary emphasis of this theory and
that, in line with the cognitive-developmental approach,

they are purported to be invariant in sequence and hier-

archical in terms of integration.
In order to explain I-level theory in a more compre-

hensive way, the concept of the "core structure of personality"
will first be described, followed by a description of the

primary levels of integration or interpersonal maturity
that make up the I-level system of development.
In describing the cognitive-developmental approach, it
was noted that cognitive theorists label the most general

modes of relating as "categories of experience."

In the

same way, a premise basic to I-level theory is that the

human organism tends to break experience into its constituent elements to provide reference points in adjusting
to the complex stimulus structure of the external world

(Sullivan, Grant, and Grant, 1957).

In line with the

interactional approach to cognitive
development, it is said
that these reference points are not
isolated from one
another, but rather are merged in a basic,
central reference
scheme or cognitive world, in which the
experienced
world of

the person is integrated with, and modified
by, personal
needs and expectations. Furthermore, the nature
and quality
of perception and experience influence the
development of

expectations and hypotheses about reference points and
thereby determine the behavioral consequences of experience.
Sullivan, Grant, and Grant continue:

Over a period of time a relatively consistent
set of expectations and attitudes is established
as a kind of interpreting and working philosophy
of life.
It is this nexus of gradually expanding
experience, expectations, hypotheses, and perceptions which makes up the core of personality.
Commimication and social interaction are crucial
determinants in the development of this core,
helping to expand and elaborate the basic potential with which a person is born (Sullivan, Grant,
and Grant, I957, p. 373).
In the same way that Kohlberg identified a basic under-

lying stability to cognitive acts which were moving toward

greater equilibrium in the interaction of the organism and
the environment, so I-level theory posits a similar stability
as complex patterns of organization are developed.

According to the theory, in the normal course of events
the individual not only becomes more differentiated as

newer and more complex patterns of organization are
developed
in such a

,

but since new stimuli tend to be assimilated
xvay

as to require the least amount of cognitive

reorganization, the person also tends to become relatively

more simplified and Integrated.

For Sullivan. Grant, and

Grant, then, it follows that the content of the
core of

personality cannot be considered to be stable; however,
the core can reasonably be viewed as an integration, as a
"set of principles about which a variety of content can be
organized."

In this sense, the theorists are hypothesizing

a basic consistency and stability in regard to the principles
of organization.

A good synthesis of the way In which 1-level theory
views the developmental process is found in the following
quote:

The normal pattern of emotional-social
development follows a trend tov7ard increasing
involvement with people, objects, and social'
institutions. These involvements give rise to
new needs, demands, and situations. Inherent
in many of these new situations are problems of
perceptual discrimination with regard to the
relationships existing betv7een the self and the
external environment. As these discriminations
are made and assimilated, a cognitive restructuring
of experience and expectancy takes place.
A new
reference scheme is then developed; a new level
However, the
of integration is achieved.
potentiality for change and the direction.
Intensity, and. character of reorganization
are determined in part by the characteristics
of the prevailing organization. The foundation
for subsequent integrations is laid in preceding
levels; the synthesis and integration of one set
of stimuli and problems are essential to the
perception of the next. Each new level of integration may be regarded as the psychological
analogue of an increasingly efficient optical
lens. The more advanced the sequel of integrations, the less the likelihood of perceptual
distortion. The person can see himself and the
world more accurately and can operate more
effectively (Sullivan, Grant, and Grant, 1957,
p.

375).

As noted previously, I-level diagnosis has been utilized

almost exclusively with an adolescent delinquent population.
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Within this population, the range
of levels found is from
Maturity Level 2 (Integration Level
2. or 1-2) to Maturity
Level 5 (1-5). Level 5. however, is
infrequently
repre-

sented, in the adolescent delinquent
population (approximately
2

per cent in the California Youth Authority).

Since

Levels 2. 3, and k represent the bulk of
juvenile offenders,
the present discussion mil limit itself
to descriptions of
some of the constructs germane to these levels
of inter-

personal maturity development.

Table

1 is

presented as

a schematic representation of some of the basic
premises
or constructs which pertain to Levels 2,
3, and 4.

The major instrument utilized in arriving at
an I-level
diagnosis is a semi-structured interview of one to
one-anda-half hours in length. The two basic goals of the
inter-

view are to obtain, in as pure a form as possible

1)

the

interviewee's perception of the world— his view of himself,
of others, and of relationships among these perceptions

(i.e., his Interpersonal Maturity Level ) and 2) the inter-

viewee's way of responding to his perceptions of the world—
his typical patterns of adjustment (i.e., subtype within

Interpersonal Maturity Level.

.

It should be noted here

that nine such subtypes have been identifed within the

delinquent population; however, the present study is concerned only with the diagnosis and validity of levels within
this system.)

The interview is set up to loosely follow a predetermined guideline of content areas to be covered in the
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Table

1

I-LEVEL SCHEMA (LEVELS 2, 3, and
CONSTRUCT:

LEVEL

COGNITIVE STYLE

(

COKPLS/'ITY)

2

Stereotypy; conceptual confusion; very
concrete thinking; anarchic in social
responses; little ability to differentiate
among people; when asked to describe
parents may say, "Parents are my mother
and father" or "Parents are Mr. and Krs,
Johnson.

LEVEL 3

Conceptual simplicity; stereotypes;
cliches; has not yet distinguished self
from learned, impersonal "rule-book"
standards; differentiates among people
in superficial way; vrhen asked to describe
parents may say, "Parents are nice. Mine
let me stay out late"; describes people
in terms of physical appearance and what
they do .

LEVEL

Conceptual complexity with the idea
capable of abstract
reasoning; ability to differentiate
among people in terms of personal,
inner meanings for their behavior;
describes people in terms of inner
dynamics and who they are (as opposed
to what they do)
may say "Parents
have a rough time of it. They try
to do the right things but often their
kids don't understand,"

^;

of patterning;

;

CONSTRUCT:

INTERNALIZATION OF STANDARDS (VALUES)

LEVEL

2:

An action is bad because it is punished;
fears retaliation vjhen commits an act;
sees laws or rules as the denying acts
of specific individuals rather than as
expressions of more generalized ethical
and controlling systems; may react to
felt denial by taking things which do
not belong to him; when asked, how he
feels when he steals things may say,
I needed it."
"I feel good.

LEVEL

3:

Rules are obeyed just because they are
rules; shame and guilt are situational
resulting from, breaking rules; no
internalized guilt is involved, although
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Table

1

(Continued)

superficial protestation of guilt are
frequent; absence of rules means no
rules; when asked how he feels about
stealing may say, "Bad. I almost
always get caught."

LEVEL

4:

Self- evaluated standards exist; morality
has been internalized; sanction for
transgression is internalized guilt;
when fails to live up to internalized
standards feels guilty and critical
of self; when asked about stealing may
say, "It's wrong to rip-off people.
I know better and I don't know why I
did it maybe for attention."

—

CONSTRUCT:

ORIENTATION TO POWER AND CONTROL

LEVEL

2

Primarily involved vjith demands that
the world take care of him; sees others
solely as "givers" or "deniers" in
terms of sources of supply; has no
sense that he can be a "generator" of
behavior in others, therefore has no
feeling of control over what happens to
him; completely at the mercy of others.

LEVEL

3;

Seeks external structure in t erms of
rules and formulae for operat ion; percelves the world and his part In it on
a power dimension; constantly concerned
with who has the power at the moment
feels has some limited power to affect
what happens to him; typical responses
are either to conform to the power or
confront it.

LEVEL ^:

CONSTRUCT:

LEVEL

Sees life as presenting many choices;
does not see self as a pawn of fate,
but feels he holds the origin of his
own destiny; has Internalized a set
of standards by which he judges his
and others' behavior.

IMPULSE CONTROL AND DELAY OF GRATIFICATION
2:

Control of impulses is lacking or at
best und ependable senses he must
communicate his desires to others but
is baffled when his demands are not
Immediately gratified; v;hen asked to
;

Table 1 (Continued)
wait a few minutes will resDond with
"I want it nowl"; may become aggressive
when not immediately gratified.

LEVEL

3:

Control of impulses better established
than at Level 2, although when faced
with peer pressure will go along with
the crowd; more successful in controlling impulses when with adults; will
often get drunk or take drugs and lose
control; can postpone gratification if
not required to do so for a very long
time.

LEVEL

^:

Long-term goals and ideals; is able to
delay gratification for long periods
of time; may say "I'm going to get a
college education and then buy that
sports car I want"
impulse control is
dependable and not as susceptible to
peer influence as at Level 3.
;

CONSTRUCT:

TII-iS

PERSPECTIVE (FORESIGHT)

LEVEL

2:

"Time-bound," i.e., very much tied to
present with little, if any, ability
to think in terms of past and future
events; concerned only with " here- and
now"; may not remember when asked, "Do
you know what we did yesterday?"

LEVEL

3:

Less bound to present events than Level
2, however, is not motivated to achieve
in a long-range sense, or to plan for
the future; demonstrates some limited
foresight but in a vague, superficial
way, e.g., "Some day I'll probably
get married and settle down."

LEVEL 4:

Possesses an ability to evaluate
past, present, and future influences;
motivated to plan the future course of
his life; understands that people change
over time, e.g., "My mother is different
than she used to be before she married
my step-father."

Table 1 - Adapted from Sullivan, Grant, and Grant (1957)
Loevlnger and Wessler (1970).
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interview session.

The interviewer begins with the broadest

possible question in each content area, and then follows
the
lead of the interviewee into more specific questions.

Questions are asked in an open-ended manner to avoid pro-

viding the interviewee with a ready-made frame of reference.

A copy of the suggested I-level interview schedule is presented in Appendix A.

Since the present study involves the question of construct validity in relation to I-level theory and the

concepts central to Levels

2,

3,

and k described above, a

brief summary of this specific type of validational procedure
seems appropriate.

Construct Validity
The concept of construct validity, as set forth in the

APA Technical Recommendations for Psychological Tests in
195^, was proposed for the situation in which

"...

the

tester had no definitive criterion measure of the quality

with which he Is concerned and must use Indirect measures
to validate the theory (APA, 195^. P. 214)."

In other words,

this type of validation was developed to assist researchers
In circumstances such as the present one, with I-level

theory, where an attempt is being made to operationalize
a new conceptual system in terms of appropriate criteria

or measures.

The task of the Investigator is to select a

measure which is logically and consistently related to the
theory so that the results can be interpreted and can lead
to future hypotheses within the same theoretical context.
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According to Cronbach and

l^ieehl

(1955). the ultimate goal of

such a valldatlonal procedure is to imbed
the new construct
in a nomological net. an Interlocking system
of laws which
constitutes a theory. They note that:
'^e do not first 'prove* the theory,
and then
validate the test, nor conversely. In any probable
Inductive type of inference from a pattern of
observations, we examine the relation between
the total network of theory and observations.
The system involves propositions relating: test
to construct, construct to other constructs, and
finally relating some of these constructs to
observables . .
Traditionally the proposition
claiming to interpret the test has been set aoart
as the hypothesis being tested, but actually the
evidence is significant for all parts of the
chain.
If the prediction is not confirmed, any
link in the chain may be wrong (Cronbach and
Keehl, 1955, P. 29^).
.

If the theory is unclearly stated, or so presented

that no hypotheses are generated, and/or the measure does

not clearly relate to the theory, then meaningful research

on it cannot be conducted and the essential network of

relationships and distinctions cannot be established.
In this approach, a fundamental distinction is made

between behavior relevance and behavior equivalence

.

In

other words, If It is impossible to find a criterion

measure which is equivalent to the trait or theory being
tested, then the investigator can search for other observable

behaviors which, while not equivalent to the trait, are

nonetheless related to It.

For exam.ple, if an investigator

has a test of the trait "depression," he might be unable
to find a criterion which is equivalent to this construct;

however, he can make a number of predictions about relevant
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behaviors which are

bnr.od

on his thoorotloal undorstandlnp;

of what Is Implied by the terra "depression. "

:juch

predictions

mlffht Include statements to the effect that those
scorlnp; hl^h

on his test would show a p;rcator Incidence of suicides,

sleep disorders, crylnp; behavior, psychiatric hospitalizations, pessimism, etc.

While none of these observable

behaviors Is In and of Itself equivalent to depression,
the verification of a number of hypotheses such as these

would lead to Increaslnp; confidence In the Investigator's

theory and Instrument.
In what became a "classic" exchanp;o In the psycholop.lcal literature, Harold Hechtoldt (1959) took stronp; Issue

with the Idea of valldatlnp: tests by means of construct

validation.

In response to Cronbach and Keohl's (1955)

article, ho hold that construct validity Is little more

then the renamlnp; of the basic process of theory bulldlnK,
and that It contained the danp;er not only of Introduclnp:

undesirable oonfuslcn, but more seriously of leading researchers In psycholopy away from a strict adherence to

operational definition which is essential to scientific
progress In psychology.

Following an eloquent attack,

Bechtoldt recommended that "the formulation of construct
validity, as presented In the several papers noted In
this critique, be eliminated from further consideration
as a way of speaking about psychological concepts, laws,
and theories (Bechtoldt, 1959. P. 62?)."

The debate continued and in i960
Donald Campbell published a further analysis of construct
validation and a
critique of Sechtoldt's position in
which he denied that
construct validation represents the abandonment
of opera-

tionalism or encourages the reification of
traits, as
Bechtoldt had argued. Campbell also suggested

the need to

distinguish two types of construct validity— trait
validity
and nomolo,sical validity. The first of these
"is applicable
at that level of development still typical of
most test

development efforts, in which 'theory,' if any, goes no
farther than indicating a hypothetical syndrome, trait, or

personality dimension.

The second type

.

.

.

would represent

the very important and novel emphasis of Cronbach and
heehl

on the possibility of validating tests by using the scores

from a test as interpretations of a certain term in a
formal theoretical network and

,

through this, to generate

predictions which would be validating

if confirmed when

interpreted as still other operations and scores (Campbell,
i960, p. 5^7)."

The present writer is sympathetic to Campbell's more

moderate position and believes that perhaps too much has
been made of this controversy.

The connotation has been

created that construct validity was offered as a new type
of validation procedure, when in actuality, as Campbell

points out, it is as old as the concept of test validity
itself, and "is needed in any inventory of the useful

procedures by which tests and theories have been shown
to be invalid in the past (Campbell, I960, p. 5^8)."

In an extensive critique of the I-level
classification
system. Becker and Heyman (1971) conclude that
due to

theoretical problems, methodological inadequacies, and

difficulties with reporting, neither the appropriateness
of the typology nor the efficacy of treatment based
on it

have been demonstrated.

They point out that "in the absence

of competing formulations, extensive human and economic

resources are being invested in the diffusion of the
(I-level) system into correctional programs in many areas.

The highest priority should be given, therefore, to
systematic efforts to study and enhance the reliability
and construct validity of the typology

Heyman. 1971,

p.

^9)."

.

.

.

(Becker and

The concept of construct validation

as presented by Cronbach and Meehl and Campbell seems

appropriate for such studies as are called for by Becker
and Heyman. since for 1-level theory no a priori defining

criterion Is available as a perfect measure or defining
operation against which to check the theory.

Rather, some

Independent way(s) of getting at "the same" traits as

postulated by the theory must be sought.
Intelligence
The relationship of intelligence to personality

development has been an issue of Importance in numerous
psychological studies.

Indeed, in a number of research

efforts noted by Anderson (i960). It was found that

intelligence carried a heavy predictive load in most
measures of outcome and emerged as a more significant

factor than the personality measures used.

In light of

findings such as these It becomes Important
to briefly
review the Intelligence literature, and to assess
the

relationship of intelligence to I-level theory.
The term "intelligence" is one that has long carried
many different meanings.

Frequently, however, in response

to the question "What is intelligence?" the common
answer

has been "Intelligence is what intelligence tests
measure."

In an effort to provide a conceptual framework of more

complexity and specificity in order to begin to answer this
query in a more differentiated way, several divergent

points of view and theoretical and empirical generalizations have evolved.

For example, factor analysts studying Intelligence
have been roughly divided into two camps

— those

who use

factorial methods that allow a general intellectual

factor (g) to emerge as the first factor of Intelligence,
and those who prefer methods which yield a number of

Independent or primary factors and no large general factor.
Guilford (1967) is perhaps the best representative of

multiple-factor analysis in the Thurstone tradition.

He

argues that current definitions of intelligence are too

narrow and vague, and that preference for a general
intellectual factor over multiple factors is due to a
restricted view of the area of intelligence, a view that
will hinder progress.

As an alternative to theories

emphasizing g, Guilford has presented a model called the
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"Structure of the Intellect,., a
model that is represented
spatially as a three-dimensional
cube. The three dimensions
are broken into four, five and six
categories, and therefore,
yield 120 cells, each of which
represents a factor.
In contrast, Vernon (I965) is
representative of factor
analysts who prefer techniques that
yield a large g factor
and who build "heirarchical" models.
Vernon's model is

represented as an inverted tree.
general intellective factor.

At the top is g. the

This factor is followed at

a lower level by two major group factors,
verbal- educational
and spatial-practical- mechanical.

Each of these is followed

by additional, minor factors such as the creative
abilities,

verbal fluency, and number factors under verbal-educational,
and spatial, psychomotor, and mechanical information
factors

under spatial-practical-mechanical.

Factors high on the

tree, then, refer to a wide variety of behaviors, and

factors low on the tree to narrower ranges of behavior.
And, In fact, Vernon believes that many of Guilford's and

Thurstone's factors are of such a low degree of generalizability that they are of no practical utility.

A theory of intelligence which falls somewhere between
g and multiple factor analysis is Cattell's theory of fluid

and crystallized intelligence (Cattell. I963; Horn and
Cattell. 1966).

Cattell has argued that the general

intelligence factor

(g)

and cooperative factors.

is in fact at least two interrelated

The first is fluid intelligence [Gf),

a "general relation-perceiving capacity which operates in
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all fields" and is biologically determined;
the second is
crystallized intelligence (Gc) a "sum of particular
,

relation-perceiving skills acquired in specific fields"
and therefore environmentally determined (Gattell,
1957,
p.

877).

Apparently Gf is conceived as some quality of

the nervous system upon which the individual, in his

encounters with the environment, builds what Gattell calls
"general solution instruments" or "aids."

The sum of

these "aids" is the factor Gq,

Numerous other approaches to conceptualizing intelligence
could be summarized, among these Guttman's (I965) facet
theory, Piaget's (1950, 1952) cog-nitive model, and various

Information-processing theories, to name a few.

However,

the theorizing of Hayes (I962) seems more germane to the

present discussion of I-level theory, since some similarities

between the two theories are apparent.
Hayes (I962) argues that intelligence is nothing more
than a collection of learned abilities and that individual

differences in intelligence are due solely to experience
producing drives (EPDs), which are inherited tendencies
to engage in activities conducive to learning.

He postulate^s

that intelligence depends not on the average strength of

all EPDs, but rather on some complex relationship among
them, and that EPDs would probably be found to correspond
to preferences for the use of various sense modalities

(although they would go beyond this).

Hayes believes that

simple skills associated with the various sense modalities

(primarily perceptual ones) are. with
experience, coinbined
into more complex strategies that can
then generate

solutions to more complex problems.

In other words.

Hayes sees EPDs as determinants of certain
types of

environmental encounters which are significant to
the

accumulation of specific kinds of abilities, and
therefore
both heredity and environment are of 100 per cent
importance
in the organism's developing intellectual functions.
In theorizing on the way in which individuals become

increasingly mature in their interpersonal perceptions
and relations. Sullivan, Grant, and Grant (195?) also

emphasize the fundamental importance of the organism

acting upon his environment, and in turn the environment

acting upon the organism.

This mutual Interaction of

organism and environment leads to a "nexus of gradually
expanding experience, expectations, hypotheses, and

perceptions which makes up the core of personality
(Sullivan, Grant, and Grant, 1957, p. 373)," and is

dependent upon the genetic predispositions the Infant
brings into the world with him, as well as the stimulation
present in the maturing child's environment.

Both Hayes

and the founders of I-level theory, then, stress the

importance of both heredity and environment in their
respective formulations.

for many years investigators of the I-level classification system in California have played down the possible

relationship

beti\feen

I-level and intelligence, citing
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correlations in the low .ao's (Palmer,
Johns. Neto. Turner,
and Pearson. I968) . More recently,
however, independent
investigative efforts have indicated
higher degrees
of

relationship between I-level a^d intelligence
than previously
reported. For instance. Cross and Tracy
(I971)
found a

correlation of .36 between I-level and
intelligence, a
coefficient quite similar to that reported
by Beverly
in another study,

(I965)

while not citing actual coefficients.

Kolof and Jesness (1972) present data which
"shows a high
degree of relationship between measured intelligence
and

I-level (Kolof and Jesness. 1972. p. 68)."

Werner (1972)

presents data which indicate a "moderate" degree
of relationship, citing a gamma value of .34.

These figures seem

reasonable in terms of I-level theory; however, one might
not expect to find such strong correlations between these
two dimensions as those reported by Zaidel in I970 (verbal
r = .59, non-verbal r = .52).

Zaldel's figures are the

highest cited in the literature.
In line with Hayes' and other (e.g.. Piaget) theoretical

formulations of intelligence, as well as the concepts
imbedded in I-level theory, a correlation between I-level
and intelligence should not be surprising.

As noted by

Molof and Jesness, the concepts of perceptual development
and cognitive differentiation, and the ability to understand
and cope with one' inner and outer worlds should theoretically

have in common certain of the attributes measured by tests
of intelligence.

It also seems reasonable that intelligence
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may affect the extent to which persons
are able to accurately
perceive and effectively react to
Individual differences In
the needs, motives, values, and styles
of verbal as well as
nonverbal expression of others, since these
latter qualities
of interpersonal functioning undoubtedly
help determine the
nature of Interpersonal relations developed
by an Individual
(and perhaps also the extent of growth-conducive
social

opportunities available to him), at least a moderate
correlation between I-level and Intelligence would not
be

unexpected.

The relatively few references to cognitive
functioning

m

the descriptions given of the various I-level
categories

do suggest differences In Intelligence.

For example, I-2s

are described as having an "undifferentiated view of others"
except In terms of whether the others are seen as "givers"
or "denlers" and low ability to differentiate Is generally

considered a characteristic of low intelligence.

"Cognltlvely

concrete" is a description given of I-3s, which also suggests
a relatively low level of cognitive functioning.

cognitive description given of

The only

is that they have

"potential for considerable Insight into meanings, dynamics,
cause and effect," which suggests a higher degree of intelligence.

These descriptions and accompanying expected Increases

in intelligence across levels are compatible with the expec-

tations of the cognitive-developmental models described
previously,
Zaidel points out that the treatment recommendations

for the various I-level groups are consistent with the

notion of differences in intelligence across
I-levels.
Traditional approaches to psychotherapy, for

instance, are

not considered appropriate for I-2s and
I-3s; rather, roleplaying techniques, activity groups, and groups
emphasizing
the influence of a positive peer culture
are recommended.

In contrast, the major treatment methods
recommended for
the large number of l-i^s are individual
psychotherapy,

group therapy, conjoint family therapy, transactional
analysis, etc., with an emphasis on the development
of

insight into conflicts, internal dynamics and feelings,
and family problems.

This differential use of insight-

oriented therapy is consistent with the general clinical

finding that traditional psychotherapy requires a fair
amount of intelligence, which it is possible that I-2s
and I-3s may not have.

The point to be made from this discussion is that

while the devotees of I-level classification do not consider intelligence to be an important or even notable

diagnostic indicant of the level of interpersonal maturity
of a youth, the theory itself and the differential treat-

ment strategies suggested, do in fact point directly to
a significant positive relationship between I-level and

Intelligence.

Chapter III

BATIONALE
As noted in a previous section, since the major
con-

cern of research in I-level theory over the past years
has been to assess the usefulness of the classification

system for the treatment of juvenile offenders, questions
related to the construct validity of the underlying theory

have essentially remained uninvestigated.

Several excep-

tions to this are three social work master's degree
studies, reported by Zaidel (1970), which apparently were
too inadequate methodologically to allow any conclusions
to be drawn.

One other exception is a recent (1970) study

by Susan Zaidel in which she addressed herself to the

construct validity questions of differences across three
I-level groups in awareness of feelings in others, and the

relationship of intelligence to I-level classification.

Among other findings, her results indicated that verbal
fluency regarding people, verbal intelligence, and race
were the most Important components of I-level, together

accounting for approximately 5^ per cent of the variance
in her study.

This type of study is obviously very

important and leads to a number of questions regarding the

theoretical base of I-level classification.
In regard to the relationship between I-level and

intelligence, Loevlnger (19^6) has reasoned that ego
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development Is not the same as
development of all functl..ons
exercised by the ego. and -in particular
intellectual
development is not a fair measure of
ego development,
even though exercise of Intelligence
is an ego function
(Loevinger. I966. p. 195)
While the present xiriter is
sympathetic to this kind of reasoning, it
may well be. at
least for the present, that intelligence
is the best measure
available for assessing I-level or ego
development.
If

this Indeed is the case (Zaidel found a
correlation of .59
between I-level and Intelligence as measured by
the Haven

Progressive Matrices and a separate verbal measure
of I.Q.).
then perhaps it is not necessary to perform the
elaborate,

time-consuming interview presently used in arriving at
I-level diagnoses.

Rather, it may be sufficient to use a

good measure of intelligence alone or in combination with

one or two other indices proven to be related significantly
to I-level.

Adapting this procedure for assessing I-level

need not necessarily imply that I-level theory is not
valid or useful.

Indeed, the present writer is of the

opinion that the usefulness of I-level classification has
been satisfactorily demonstrated in terms of its effectiveness for the management and differential treatment of
juvenile offenders.

Questions remain, however, as to the

relationship between I-level and intelligence as well as
to the importance of the constructs reputedly central to

I-level (see Table 1).

It seems necessary to evaluate those

constructs in relation to the degree to which they in fact

do differentiate persons at various
levels of development
within this system. Referring to
Table 1. then, the

following assumptions of I-level theory
are considered
for investigation.
It should be noted that for ease
of
reference these statem.ents are labeled
as hypotheses;

however, for this kind of study a more
proper and accurate
procedure would be to describe empirical tests
of relation
ships between measures of the various
constructs.
SZ2£th^esis_l:

Youths at hig-her levels of int er-

per sonal maturity are more internall y_jrrl_g.rTt^
in relation to control of their lives, i.e.,

they are more in clined to interpret important

reinforcements as consequences of their own
behavior, rathe r than due to extrinsic factors
in the environment

.

Youths at Level

2

in

development feel they have no control at all
over their ovm destiny and that they are

completely at the mercy of their environment.
At Level

3,

youths feel they have some limited

power to affect what happens to them, although
they are still concerned with who has the poi/er
at any given m.oment, and in relating to that
pox^^er.

Level k youths give evidence of a

greater internal orientation than youths at
lower levels due to their feeling that they
can control their ovm destiny,

and.

because of

the existence of an internalized value system.
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Hypothesis

2

:

Yojiths at hiP,her l.vels
of

£ersonaa_n^
tha-n

those at

are mor^ n o^nltlvel
.Iqw eiL

mtP.y nnnnj^^

levels of development.

At Level 2, youths denonstrate
very concrete
thinking, a tendency toward
stereotypy, and
little ability to differentiate
between

persons and objects in the environment.

Youths at Level

3

give evidence of conceptual

simplicity and are capable of making
superficial differentiations. Level k
youths

demonstrate conceptual complexity with
the
Idea that there is a patterning and
organization of responses, and are more capable
of

abstract reasoning than youths at lower
levels on the continuum.

Hypothesis,^;

Youths at higher lev els of Intf^r-

personal maturity have internalized their
own standards and values and therefore
experience greater internalized guilt.

Youths

at Level 2 have little, if any conception of

right and wrong and for them an action is bad

because it is punished.

Level 3 youths obey

rules just because they are the rules, and
the guilt they experience is situational,

resulting from breaking rules.

Youths

Integrated at Level ^ have self- evaluated
standards, an internalized morality, and

experience more intense feelings of guilt when
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they do not live up to
their self-imposed
stand ards.

H;s:£0thesi^

Yoijjh^^higher

^ilg^Ulouth^^
Control

of

^

level ._ofj_v^^_

levels Of

d eveloT.r..^jv_

impulses is said to be lacking
or

at best undependable in
persons at Level 2.

Level

youths' impulse control is
better

3

established, yet still quite
susceptible to
peer influence. ?or youths at
Level 4,

Impulse control is dependable and
less
susceptible to peer persuasion than
at

Level 3.
Hypothesis

Youths at hi,^her level

^5:

personal

^turity

.9

of inter-

are more able to del^v

gratificati on than youths at lower levels.

Level

2

youths are basically oriented

tox^^ard

having iiranediate gratification of needs and
are not able to delay gratification for even

very brief periods of time.

Level

Youths at

can postpone gratification if not

3

required to do so very long.

At Level ^,

long-term goals and ideals are expressed
and youths at this level are able to delay
reward for extended periods of time.
Hyr)othesis 6

:

Youths at hig:her levels of inter-

personal maturity possess c^reater ability to
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exercise foresln:ht a nd plan behavior.

Youths

at Level 2 are "time-bound" x^ith
little axmre-

ness of past and future events.

Level 3

youths have the ability to exercise foresight
to a limited extent, but are not
motivated

to achieve in a long-range sense, or to
plan

for the future.

Youths at Level

in develop-

ment possess an ability to evaluate past,
present, and future influence, are motivated
to plan for the future, and demonstrate

greater

f oresightf ulness and

planned behavior

than youths at lower levels.

Hypotheses

7

and

8

;

following Zaidel, the prediction

is made that there is a significant positive

relationship between I-level diagnosis and
verbal and non-v erba l intellip:ence

.

An

extension of these related hypotheses may be

viewed as the Devil's Advocate hypothesis of
the present study:

^'hen

systematic grou^

differences in intelligence are controlled
by matching or statistical procedures, all of
the differences predicted above disappear.

As noted above, confirmation of this and at
least some other hypotheses

x\rould

imply that

there is some utility to I-level assessments,
but that simple intelligence tests would

perhaps have equivalent utility as the procedures for classification.

Chapter IV
METHOD
Sub.lects

The sample consisted of 138 male and
female youth
offenders ranging in age from I3 to 21 years,
the majority
of whom were Incarcerated In two training
schools which
serve the courts of the State of Colorado for
confinement
of juvenile offenders.

Subjects were divided into three

groups according to their I-level classification:
1-3, and

1-2,

Due to the scarcity of I-2s In the correctional

population (less than

5

per cent as reported in the California

Youth Authority), and a preponderance of I-3s and I-^s, the
three groups did not contain equal numbers of subjects.

Since only six I-2s were available from the Colorado
population,

thirty -five additional subjects were procured

from the Northern Reception Center and Clinic in Sacramento,
California, nine of whom were identified as I-2s.

These

nine additional California youths were added to the Colorado
sample of I-2s, as well as I3 California I-3s and 13 I-^s,

resulting in the following number of subjects in each group:
15 I-2s, 55 I-3s, and 68 I-^s.

Approximately 35 per cent

of the total number of subjects were female, all of whom

were from the Colorado sample.
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Measures

I-level d1ae_n o^.

I-level diagnoses are currently

available for a majority of the delinquent
correctional
population
Colorado. These diagnoses are

m

established

by raters who have been thoroughly
trained (many by ,/arren
and her staff
a five-week training course In
Sacramento)
I-level theory. Interviewing, and
diagnosis, and whose
ratings have been validated against
criterion tapes In
California. Described by V/arren (I966).
interviewers

m

m

trained in I-level diagnosis conduct a
tape-recorded one
to one-and-a-half hour semi-structured
interview designed
to elicit the interviewee's characteristic
level
of

perceptual differentiation as well as his typical
reactions
or response sets to his perceptions (see Appendix
A).

The

interviewer determines the diagnosis followed by a
second
trained rater listening to the taped interview and
also

making a diagnosis.

Molof (I969) reports an average of

82 percent agreement in terms of level diagnosis between

first and second raters using the Warren interview.

Intelligence

.

Verbal and non-verbal (performance)

scores from the iVechsler Intelligence Scale for Children
(V/ISC)

(i/echsler, 19^9) were available for most of the

youths in the study,

,/hen l/ISC

scores were not available,

verbal and non-verbal scores from the Lorge-Thorndlke were
used

.

Internal- external focus

.

Subjects were administered

the Rotter Internal- eternal Focus of Control Scale
(Rotter, 1966).

Locus of control refers to the disposition

to perceive one's reinforcements as consequences of one's
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own behavior or as due to extrinsic
factors.

Those persons

believe that they exercise some control
over their
destinies are considered to be internally
oriented
;^ho

and

controlled.

Externals believe that their reinforcements

are controlled by luck, chance, fate, or
powerful others.
A wide variety of construct validity is available
for this
measure.
It has been used rather extensively and
research
findings indicate that it has proved to be useful
in the

prediction of a variety of behaviors.

A bibliography of

the locus of control literature through I969 cites
over
325 references, indicating a considerable amount of

continuing interest in this construct (Throop and flacDonald,
1971).

In addition to the I-E scale administered to the
subjects, two or three people who knew respective subjects

fairly well (e.g., house parents, cottage counselors) were
asked to fill out brief informal rating scales with

behavioral descriptions of the concepts central to this
internal- external dimension.

These scales are listed in

Appendix B.
Cognitive complexity.

David Hunt (1970) has devised

a method for assessing the conceptual level or cognitive

complexity of adolescents from 12 to 18 years of age.

To

index conceptual level Hunt writes that "we have used a

method that requires the person to do some 'conceptual work'
by reacting to a stimulus likely to require some 'cognitive
v;ork'

in his response (p. 71)."

Specifically, Hunt's
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Paragraph Completion Method consists of
six topics, to each
of which the subject responds with three
or four
sentences

Indicating his own personal reactions to the
topics.
topics are:
"What I think about rules .
.

criticized

.

.

I

..uhen I am

.";'V;hat I think about parents

someone disagrees with me
and "V/hen

;

.

.

."

am told what to do

"When

;

.

.

I

The

am not sure

"When
.

.

."

;

Each of the six

responses Is a unit to be coded according to the
scoring
manual (Hunt, Lapln, Llberman. McManus. Post, Saballs,
Sweet,
and Victor, I968)

.

A person's Index of cognitive complexity

is calculated as a composite of his six scores, generally

using the average of the highest three scores on the test.
i;ith trained

raters. Hunt reports Inter- rater reliability

to be .80 to .85.

Several studies are cited as evidence of

the construct validity of this approach (e.g.. Hunt and

Dopyera, I966; Hunt, Hardt, and Victor, I968; r4cLachlan,
1969)

,

and this plus the fact that the measure was devised

to be used with adolescents, as well as the apparent

similarity between Hunt's stages of cognitive complexity
and the I-level stages being investigated, indicate Hunt's

instrument is an appropriate measure for determining cognitive
complexity.

An additional measure of cog-nitlve complexity was
several informal rating scales containing descriptions of

concepts involved in the dimension of conceptual complexity.

These were administered to people who were in contact with
the respective subjects and

x^ho

Imew the youths fairly well.

These scales are presented in Appendix C.
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Internalization of ^uilt

.

Kosher (Kosher, I966;

x^uma

and Mosher. I967) has developed a scale
which purports to
measure a person's generalized expectancy
for self -mediated
punishment for violating or anticipating the
violation of

internalized stajidards of proper behavior.

The Mosher Guilt

Scale (KGS) was originally developed as a
sentence-completion

measure of guilt using referents suggested by the
psychoanalytic conception of guilt to score the completions.
From
the Mosher Incomplete Sentence Test, a forced-choice
and
true-false measure of three aspects of guilt were constructed
(1966)

.

The forced-choice alternatives (79 items) were

subjected to an internal consistency item analysis and

matched for social desirability in college males.

A

multitrait-multlmethod matrix analysis of the three measures
of the three aspects of guilt (sex guilt, hostile guilt,

and morality-conscience guilt) revealed that the forced-

choice version of the MGS has a high split-half reliability
(in the .90'

s)

and provided evidence of convergent and

discriminant validity (Mosher, I966)

.

Huma and Kosher

(1967) later showed a significant correlation (p<.01)

between level of guilt (as measured by the MGS) and level
of moral judgment (as measured by Kohlberg's method of

assessing the developmental level of moral judgment) in
delinquent boys.

This reported correlation with a construct

embedded in a developmental model and with a delinquent

population indicates the KGS is an appropriate measure
for internalized guilt in the present study.

An additional measure of guilt
which was utilized
several rating scales, administered
to house

1;
.s

parents, cas,36

^'orkers.

etc. who were familiar with
the subjects, vjhioh

described various aspects of the
dimension of internalized
guilt. These scales are given in
Appendix D.
Impulse control. fores ig:ht. and ability
to p l^n.
The
non-verbal Porteus Maze tests (Porteus, I965)
have been
used in several studies (Erikson and
Roberts. I97I; Doctor
and Winder, 195^; Fooks and Thomas.
1957) to differentiate

between various groups differing in impulsiveness,
foresight,
and planfulness. This test provides two
scores:
a Test

Quotient (TQ) which appears to measure non-verbal
foresight
and planning ability, and a Qualitative
(Q)

score which is

a measure of impulse control and has been demonstrated
to

differentiate between groups on this dimension.

Erikson

and Robert (1971) found a correlation of .03 between TQ

and intelligence, v;hile the correlation between Q and

intelligence was .00. both obviously not significantly

different from zero.
.31

(p< .05).

In their study, TQ and Q correlated

Porteus (1965) noted that delinquents who

were given the mazes seemed to enjoy taking the test, and
he cited numerous studies using his test with delinquent

populations.

In fact Porteus devised the Q score to take

account of the frequency of errors in execution he found

among various delinquent and nondelinquent populations.
While Porteus considers the concepts of impulse control
and foresight in his book, he does not claim that his

:

test measures these abilities,
although he does cite studi es
other than his own, which indicate
the mazes are sensitive
to these factors (e.g.. Kainer,
I965)
These considerati ons
coupled With later investigative
efforts using the Porteus
Maze Tests (e.g.. Erikson and Roberts.
197I)
suggest it is
an appropriate measure to be used
with delinquents and in
.

.

differentiating groups on these two dimensions.
Delay of gratification

.

The measure used to determine

ability to postpone gratification was a
choice-of-prizes
test made popular by N. T. Feather
(1959).
Subjects were
informed at the beginning of the first testing
session that
they would each receive :^2.0Q for participation
in the

experiment.

At the end of the first session, however,
each

subject was individually presented a

card,

with the following

options

Alternative 1

Alternative

1st week

^

2nd week

^U.25

$2.00

Total

:$2.00

;;^2.25

.75

^

2

.25

Those subjects who decided upon the second alternative were
considered to delay gratification.

This is a simple measure

yet effective in Its differentiation of those subjects who

are able to control their impulses and those who demand

iMnedlate gratification.
Proced ure

Rotter's I-E scale, the Kosher Guilt Scale, and Hunt's
sentence com.pletion measure of cognitive complexity were

.

if6

administered to groups of 10 to
I5 subjects at a time.
Administration of these three measures
averaged about oneand-one-half hours per group.
Administration of Feather's
test was carried out individually
at the end of this first

sesslon.l

One week later, individual sessions
were arranged
with each subject for administration
of the Porteus Maze
Tests and the completion of payment
for the Feather

choice-

of-prlzes task.

Instructions were the standard ones
accompanyIng the five measures.
(See Appendixes F through K for
measures and instructions.) Subjects, at
the beginning of
the first testing session, were offered
.^2.00 for participating in the experiment. The Experimenter
asked
the

subjects to be as honest as possible and
assured them of
the confidentiality of their responses to the
various tests
( See
Appendix F
)

The informal rating scales measuring the observations
of house parents, cottage counselors, etc. of
each of the

subjects on the dimensions of internal- external locus of
control, cognitive complexity, and internalization of guilt
(plus one additional scale which was used in order to

assess possible contamination due to the observer's fondness
or dislike for individual subjects, see Appendix

E)

were

combined into one rating form and administered to two or
three of these observers for each subject.

The adminlstra-

Due to restrictions concerning the payment of
money to youths in the Northern Reception Center and Clinic,
it vias not possible to administer the Feather delay of
gratification measure to the California subjects.

.
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tlon took Place as close as
possible to the tl.e when
subjects
were administered the first
phase of the experimental
tasks.

Observers filling out rating
sheets were assured of the
confidentiality of their responses.

Treatment of Data

A preliminary analysis was performed
to assess the
comparability of the data from the
California and Colorado
subjects.

A state-by-I-level analysis of
variance for each
dependent variable was performed and in
no case
was the

state-by -l-level interaction term
significant, indicating
that the two samples could Justifiably
be combined for futher
analysis.

Several previous studies had indicated
that age
1969) and ethnic background (Zaidel. 197O; Cross
and
I97I) were important correlates of I-level.

(Ilolof

Tracy,

In addition,

the present study included both male and female
subjects,

providing an opportunity for an analysis of possible
sex
differences and I-level which had not been examined to any
significant degree in other studies.

To examine the possible

effects of age, sex. and ethnic background on the present

I-level data, an initial correlation matrix was derived for
the independent and dependent measures.

A subsequent analysis

was then performed to partial out the differences due to age,
sex, and ethnic background.

The partial correlation matrix

revealed a slight reduction of some of the higher original
correlations, and a slight raise of some of the lower ones,
but had no substantial effect on the p values associated

,
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with the tests of the principal hypotheses.

Appendix L

presents a summary of the correlation coefficients for the
original and partialed

data.

The tests of the principal

hypotheses in the results section were performed by analysis
of variance since the correlational analyses included some

scores whose conformance to parametric assumptions is

questionable.

Nevertheless, the partial correlation matrix

was sufficiently convincing to make it unnecessary to covary
out the effects of these differences due to sex, age, and

ethnic background in the analyses of variance in the tests
of the principal hypotheses.

Previous studies

iiad

also indicated a significant

correlation between I-level and socio-economic status (SE3).
Using a modified version of Ilollingshead and Redlich's Index
of Social Position (I958), an attempt was made to collect

SES data for each subject.

Unfortunately, this effort

proved successful for slightly less than half of the total

number of subjects,

and.

consequently the SES data could not

be Included for formal analysis.

A preliminary one-way

analysis of variance, however, indicated that, at least for
the subjects with SES data available, SES was not an important

influence on I-level classification (F = O.3I, 2 and 5^
ns)

d.f

.

A description of the analyses performed to test the
eight principal hypotheses, as well as subsequent analyses
of the data, is presented immediately below.

Chapter V
RESULTS
In the first part of this section,
analyses of variance
will be presented in order to test
the eight principal

hypotheses advanced in Chapter III.

For three of the

hypotheses, alternative measures were available:

tionnaire measure and a behavioral rating.

a ques-

The initial

tests of the hypotheses, then, consist of eleven
analyses
of variance.

The order of presentation of the hypotheses

has no particular significance, i.e., as a construct,

internal locus of control is not necessarily more central
to I-level theory than, for instance, impulse control.

The second part of the section will consist of analyses
to further delineate and clarify the results shown from the

tests of the principal hypotheses.

These will consist of

a multltrait-multimethod matrix analysis of the duplicate

measures, a factor analysis of the dependent measures, a

discriminant function analysis of the dependent measures,
and a comparative analysis of alternative measures to I-level

classification.

Tests of Principal Hypotheses

The first hypothesis stated that youths at higher
levels of interpersonal maturity are more internally orien ted
in

relation to control of their lives
k9

.

i.e., they are more
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inclined to mt.r.r.f,

1 Try.

o rtanl_r elnf^^^^

Of their own behavior rather
than 6u.

m

the environment

,

m

as 0.0..., .^.^
..^^^^

n slc facto-)rs

addition to the Hotter questlonnal:
.re

measure of locus of control (I-E
Scale), behavioral ratin.
igs
were obtained for each subject on
the internal-.
external

dimension.

Table

2

presents the means and analyses of

variance of locus of control on three
I-level groups for
both measures.

There appears to be some tendency for more
mature
(higher I-level) youths to be more Internally

oriented,

although the questionnaire results are far less
convincing
than the behavioral ratings.
The second hypothesis stated that youths at higher
levels of interpersonal maturity are more cog,-nltively complex th an those at lower levels of development .

Table

3

presents the means and analysis of variance for three
I-level groups on Hunt's paragraph completion measure of

cognitive complexity (CC)

,

as well as for the behavioral

ratings obtained for each subject on this construct.

Both of these analyses strongly confirm the second
hypothesis of greater cognitive complexity among youths at

higher levels of interpersonal maturity.
Hypothesis

3

claimed that youths at higher levels of

interpersonal maturity have internalized their own standards
and values and therefore experience greater internalized

guilt than youths at lower levels

.

Table 4 presents means

and analysis of variance for Hosher's Guilt Scale (FOS) on
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Table

2

KEANS AND ANALYSES OF VARIANCE OF
LOCUS OF CONTROL
FOR THREE I-LEVEL GROUPS

I-Level Group

Rotter

^^e^
=

I-i^ sn..i .

SD

Behavioral R^tin..

Mean

SD

11.80

2.51

13.69

2.62

1-3 (n = 55)

10.69

3.36

12.13

2.58

I-^ (n = 68)

10.06

if.

08

10.62

2.3^+

F-test

(2,

135 df)

F = 1.68, ns

F = 11.6?.

p< .001

Note.— A high score indicates external locus of control.

Table

3

MEANS AND ANALYSES OF VAHIAN-CE
OF COGNITIVE COMPLEXITY
FOH THREE I-LEYEL GROUPS
^^^^^lSl-Gr£U£

Hunt CC Measure

Behavioral Hatin.

1-2 (n = 15)

0.55

0.34

9.53

2.35

1-3 (n = 55)

1.07

0.27

10.75

3.06

'-"^

1-^2

0.49

12.96

2.50

F-test

=
(2,

135 df)

? = 32.23.

p<

.001

F = I5.O8,

p<

.001

high score Indicates greater cognitive
coraplexity.
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Table k
MEANS AND ANALYSES OF VARIANCE OF
INTERNALIZED GUILT
FOR THREE I-LEVEL GROUPS

I-Level GrouD

jlogher

Mm
1-2 (n = 15)
=

I-^ (n = 68)

F-test

Note.

(2,

-A

135 df)

Gullt^cale
SD

Behavioral Rati..
Meaji

SD

.4.53

15.60

10.49

2.35

0-95

15.^3

11.65

1.88

0.09

19.17

12.38

1.67

F = 0.58, ns

f = 7.10,

p<

high score Indicates more internalized guilt.

.01

5^

three I-level groups, and for the
behavioral ratings obtained
as an alternative measure of
Internalized guilt.

As measured by the Mosher questionnaire,
internalized
guilt is clearly not related to
I-level.
The groups do diff er
reliably on the behavioral rating of
this variable, but
sub-

sequent analysis will show that this result
must be treated
with some skepticism.
It is concluded that the I-level
groups do not differ on internalized guilt.

A fourth hypothesis stated that youths at higher
levels
of interpersonal m aturity have greater
impulse control than
youths at lower leve ls of develop ment.

Table

5

presents

means and analysis of variance for the performance of
three

I-level groups on the Porteus

I'.azes

(Q-score), a measure of

impulse control.

The large F-ratio in this analysis indicates a highly
significant relationship between Impulse control and levels
of interpersonal maturity, vjhich confirms the original

hypothesis.

The fifth hypothesis stated that youths at higher levels
of interpersonal maturity are more able to delay Rratifica-

tlon than youths at lower levels .

Table

6

presents means

and analysis of variance for Feather's Cholce-of-Prlzes

Test on I-levels

2,

3,

and 4.

The overall analysis of variance falls to confirm the
hypothesis, although the 1-2 group differs significantly
(p <

.001) from both other groups.

This is in line with

the prediction, but this result must be regarded with some

Table

5

MEANS AND ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
OF IMPULSE CONTHOL
(POHTEUS Q SCORK) FOR THREE I-LfiVEL
GROUPS

Note.

I-Level Group

Mean

1-2 (n = 15)

3Z^..27

16.86

1-3 (n = 55)

23.16

i3.6Af

I-^ (n - 68)

17.63

10.13

-A

SD

low score indicates more impulse
control.

The F-ratio between groups was
11.35,
2.

135 df. p

<

.001.
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Table 6

MEANS MID ANALYSIS OP VAHIAiNCh; OF DELAY
OP GflATIFICATION
(FEATHER CHOICE-OF-PRIZES TEST) FOR THREE
I-LEVEL GROUPS
1-Level Group

Mean

SD

1-2 (n = 6)

1.17

0.37

1-3 (n =

^4-2)

1.60

0.k9

(n = 55)

1.62

0.^9

Note.- A high score indicates greater delay of gratification.

The F-ratio between groups was 2.33,

2,

100 df, ns.

.
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reservation because of the very
small sample in the 1-2
group (6)

A Sixth hypothesis posited that
youths at
of interpersonal maturity n n.c... ^
^eater

.

hl

ability

.

foresight and Dl anbeha^

Table

7

..r^

.h..
t.r.

........

presents means and

analysis of variance for the
performance of three I-level
groups on the Porteus Hazes Test
(TQ score)
a behavioral
measure of foresight and planning ability.
.

The significant relationship between
levels of interpersonal maturity and foresight confirms
the hypothesis that
youths at higher levels of development
demonstrate a greater
ability to plan behavior.

Two final hypotheses were addressed to the
relationship
of I-level classification and intelligence.
These predicted
a significant positive relationship between
I-level and

verbal intelligence, on the one hand, and non-verbal
(performance) Intelligence on the other.

Table

8

presents

the means and analyses of variance for verbal and non-verbal

(performance) I.Q., as measured by the Wechsler Intelligence

Scale for Children (WISC), for I-levels 2, 3, and k.

The large ?-ratio in both of these analyses indicates
a highly significant positive relationship between I-level

diagnosis and both verbal and non-verbal (performance)
Intelligence, as measured by the WISC.

Multitrait-Kultimethod Matrix Analysis of Duplicate Measures

Due to the nature of the results bearing on the constructs
of locus of control and internalized guilt, in which the

Table

7

MEAJIS iLND

AMALYSI3 OF VAHIAiMCE OF
FORESIGHT
(PORTEUS TQ SCORE) FOR THREE
I-LEVEL GROUPS
I -Level Groirn

Note.

Kean

SD

1-2 (n = 15)

10/^..

80

16.90

1-3 (n = 55)

112.2^

15.68

I-^ (n = 68)

119. i^0

12.81

-A

high score indicates more foresight.

The F-ratio between groups was
7.68,
2,

135 d.f.

p <

.001.
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Table

8

MEANS AMD ANALYSES OF VAHIAflCE
OF .ISC INTEILIGEIKS
FOR THHEE I-LEVEL GflOUPS

I-Level Orniin

Verbal
v eroai i.q.
to

r,
^
Performance
1.9 .

1-2 (n = 15)

76.07

12.16

77.O7

I5.9I

1-3 (n = 51)

83.90

10.

92.08

16. li^

l-l* (n = 68)

97.00

10.67

m.in

12.15

P-test (2. 131 df)

F=34.53. p< .001

F=26.36. p< .001
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questionnaire measures and behavioral
ratings elicited
discrepant relationships with I-level
classification,

a

further analysis was performed to
clarify these difference;es
the two methods of measurement.
Kultitrait-multimethod
matrii. analysis (Campbell and
Fiske. 1959) has been proposed for situations such as this, in
which Intercorrelations
of more than one trait each measured by
more than one method
are appraised for evidence of convergent
and discriminant

m

validity.

Campbell and Fiske noted that tests can be

considered as combinations of method

different proportions.

ajid

trait variance in

Thus, quite aside from specific

content, reliable variance may be elicited by measurement

procedures which are logically, although not operationally,

distinct from content.

Table

9.

then, presents a multitralt-

multimethod matrix analysis of the alternate measures of
locus of control (I-E)

cognitive complexity (CC)

,

internalized guilt (IG)

.

,

and

The two methods of measurement

used, questionnaire and behavior ratings, are designated

in the table, respectively, as Instrument and rated variables.

Before evaluating the matrix, it should be noted that
this is an unusual use of the multltralt-multimethod approach

because the Instrument variables are not measured by exactly
the same mthods.

Two of the Instruments are forced-choice

questionnaires, while the other is an incomplete sentences
test.

However, they do share in common the written format

and can logically be expected to correlate with intelligence.
In this sense they are considered to share the same method

I

V

i

i
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of measurement.

The rated variables more
obviously shar.
the same method because the ratings
for all three
trait:

were made by the same judges in
each case.
Several informal criteria have been
proposed by Campbell
and Fiske for evaluating the
multitrait-multimethod matrix.
One of these is that the heteromethod
convergent validities
should be statistically significant and
high enough
to

warrant further consideration of their
validity.

The

mtercorrelations on the validity diagonals presented
in
Table

9

meet these criteria (p

<

.01), giving evidence of

acceptable convergent validity for both the instrument
and
rated measures ofthe three constructs. Another
criterion
is that convergent validities should be higher
than inter-

correlations between the test and the irrelevant variables,

which would be expected to share neither trait nor method
variance.

In the present matrix this condition is also met

satisfactorily, except for the correlations of instrument
CG with rated I-E (-.29) and rated IG (.2?).

The consis-

tently high correlations of all the rated variables with

Instrument CC suggests that some informal (perhaps unconscious) assessment of the youth's cognitive complexity

invests all of the judgments by the cottage staff and caseworkers.

A further criterion is that the intercorrelations
should be higher with relevant traits measured by independent

methods than with irrelevant traits measured by a common
method.

This condition refers to the discriminant validity
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Of the methods being used.

Referring to the momomethod

matrices In the lower right and
upper left quadrants of
Table 9, It is apparent that this
criterion Is not met.
Rather, the heterotralt-monomethod
correlations are higher
than the monotralt-heteromethod
correlations (the validity
coefficients In parentheses) for all the
rated variables
and for the Instrument assessment
of l-E with IG.
The
only monomethod correlations that meet
the criterion are
those for Instrument assessment of CC
with

I-E and with IG.

It Is feasible that the heterotralt-monomethod
correlation
of -.28 between Instrument I-E and IG
may be because they

share the same test format (forced-choice).

Each of these

correlated only .02 with the sentence completion
measure
of cognitive complexity (CC).

The excellent discriminant validity for Instrument CC
strongly affirms the construct validity of I-level with
regard to this variable.

The mixed discriminant validity

for Instrument IG and I-E

has-

little consequence for this

study since neither validated I-level theory In the Initial

analyses presented here.

However, the lack of discriminant

validity for the behavioral ratings Is disturbing because
they unequivocally validated I-level theory In all three
respects. This, plus their consistently high correlation

with Instrument CC, raises the ominous prospect that the

Devil may have more to say about Intelligence than this
study otherwise can show for Interpersonal maturity.

.

6k

What is being suggested here. In
part, is that method
variance In the form of possible "halo"
and "leniencyeffects
the behavior ratings (see Berkshire.
195S) may
have been responsible for not allowing
the raters

m

to

discriminate sufficiently among the various
constructs
being measured. It may have been, for

instance, that the

raters were primarily responding to their
assessment of a
youth's cognitive complexity, and then
"unconsciously"

Judging him on the dimensions of Internalized guilt
and
locus of control in a way which would fit their
prior

assessment of his cognitive traits.

On the other hand, the

observers may have made their ratings higher or lower on
the three variables simply in terms of whether they

personally liked or disliked the youths.

The preference

or liking rating Included among the items on the behavior

rating form (see Appendix

E)

was included as a control

for this type of possible "halo" effect, an analysis of
which may help clarify the nature of the rater judgments.
To this end, a correlational analysis of the preference

rating was performed.

For ease of comparison. Table 10

presents both the original correlation matrix of the

preference or liking variable with the three instrument
and three rated, variables, and a partial correlation matrix
of these six variables with liking for the youth partlaled
o ut

The significant correlations between liking and the
three rating variables indicate a substantial amount of
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"halC effect in the ratings.

However, removing the
effect
Of personal li.ing .i,
not decrease the validity
coefficients
Of the rated variables.
Apparently the rater's
personal
attachment to the child cannot
explain the correlation
of

the ratings with interpersonal
maturity level.
Since personal liking is only
one of many variables
Which ca. contribute to -halo.,
effects, and since a positive
correlation was noted between the
liking rating and the
instrument measure of CC (r = .1^4-.
1, 136 df.
p < .10), it

continued to seem possible, as
suggested above, that the
raters were responding to the
level of cognitive complexity
of a youth, and then rating him
accordingly on the other
two constructs,
support of this notion, other studies
have shovm (see Foster. Horn and
V/anberg. 1972) that

m

frequently when raters judge a person
favorably or unfavorably
on a dimension which is personally
important
to them, it is

consequently very difficult for them to avoid
adjusting
their ratings on the other dimensions being
evaluated

to

correspond with their favorable or unfavorable
perceptions
of the person on the dimension which they
consider most
important.

As a further consideration of possible contribution
to "halo" effect in the present study, a correlation
of .16

was found between the liking rating and verbal intelligence
(P < .05).

Conceivably the raters may have been responding

primarily to the intelligence of the youths in making their
judgements, or perhaps to a combination of the effects of
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Of verbal I.Q. and
cognitive level,

m

an attempt, then, to
further clarify the bases for
the rater Judgments, an
additional analysis of the rater
variables was performed.
Table 11 presents the results
obtained «hen the effects due
to cognitive complexity and
verbal I.Q. are removed from
the

behavioral ratings.
As is obvious from the table,
the reasoning that
supported the supposition that
either cognitive complexity
or verbal I.Q. or both were
significantly influencing the
rater judgments is clearly discredited.
Rather, the resultant
reduction in the size of the validity
coefficients
of the

rated variables is minimal.
In conclusion, taking all of these
analyses together
with the lack of discriminant validity
shox^ for the ratings.
It is virtually impossible to justify
a claim of construct

validation for I-level for the constructs of
locus of control
and internalized guilt on the basis alone of
the significant
relationships shown between the rater variables of
these two

constructs and I-level in the F-tests of the principal
hypotheses.

In other words, it is concluded that the rating

data support the validity of I-level theory in a general
way but hard.ly indicate much specific construct validity.

Something consistent with the theory was tapped by the
ratings, but it is difficult to delineate precisely what
that

vias.

It will be Important to include these rated

variables in the more complicated analyses which follow,
and to observe them closely for possible clues regarding
their Interpretation,
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Table 11

SUMMARY OF CORRELATIONAL A.IALYSES
OF l^TEE VARIABLES WITH
COGNITIVE COMPLEXITY PARTIAL.ED OOT
ALONE AI.D COGNITIVE

COMPL-aiT AND VERBAL

I.Q. PARTIALED OUT TOGETHER

Cofrnltlve Compleyltv Partialf>d
Out

Hater Variables
CC

IG

CC

1.00

-.73

^

<8
'^^

^"^

--"^^

1.00

-Ak

.58

^Ak

1.00

Rater
4
M
Variables

I-E

Cop:nltl ve Complexity and Verbal
I.Q
Partlaled Out Tonrether

Rater Variables
CC
CC

1.00

Rater
I-E

-.7^

IG
.58

1.00

Variables
IG

I-E

.58

'Ah

1.00

Factor

70

Analy8l,s__^^^ent

Keasurei

Factor analysis is mainly
important because of its
usefulness in the clarification
of constructs.

Accordin;.
to Nunnally (I967), the
first step in the explication
of
constructs is to develop measures
of

particular attributes

Which are thought to be related
to the construct (in Ilevel theory, such attributes
as locus of control,
cognitive complexity, ability to
delay gratification,
etc.).
The second step is to correlate
scores on the

different measures considered important.

These correla-

tions are then analyzed to determine
whether

1)

all the

measures are dominated by one common
factor.

2)

all the

measures are dominated by specific factors,
or 3) the
measures tend to break up into a number
of common factors
(Nunnally. I967). if the analysis indicates,
for instance,
that item number two is the case, then the
third step in

the explication of a construct is to perform
experiments

relating that construct to other constructs.
The first part of this section of the data analysis
has been directed toward assessing the nature of
the rela-

tionship of particular attributes to I-level classification;
these are attributes which have been theorized to be
Importajit. but have not been shoiMn empirically to be so.

As has been shorn in the previous analyses, most of these
attributes do in fact appear to be significantly related
to I-level.

It is appropriate at this point, therefore,

to investigate the specificity or communality of the

variables related to I-level, or as Cattell (I966) has
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described the process, to see "the
resolution of many
variables into fewer." Factor analysis
is a useful tool
for this kind of construct validation
and provides a means
by which the dimensionality of the
present data can be
viewed more parsimoniously.

For a broad examination of the relationships
that
existed amons the larger pool of variables
an

intercorrela-

tion matrix was obtained for 25 variables.

An 11 by 11

submatrix of the major variables considered
central to
I-level theory was extracted from this larger
matrix for
further analysis.
(The delay of gratification variable
was omitted due to the ujiavai lability of data for
a number
of subjects

3ji

one of the groups.)

Eigenvalues and eigen-

vectors were obtained from this submatrix with a principal

components analysis and four factors were retained with

associated eigenvalues (roots) greater than one (Horn,
1965).

A principal factor solution was then derived by

entering the squared multiple correlations of each variable
with all other variables into the diagonal of the matrix
as initial lower-bound communality estimates.

Iterations

were then performed (with four factors) until communality
values from immediately preceding solutions converged for
each variable.

This procedure has been shown to converge

by Wrlgley (I956),

Factors

vieve

then rotated to an approxi-

mation to simple structure (Thurstone, 19^7), by application
of the Varimax procedure (Kaiser, I958).

The four orthogonal

factors provided by this rotation and the respective loadings
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for the eleven variables are
presented in Table 12. In
discussing the factors, coefficients
of .30 or larger will
be given major emphasis in
defining a primary
factor,

although occasionally, coefficients
as low as .25 will be
used for help in interpreting a
factor.

An overall interpretation of the
analysis presented

i.
in

Table 12 is that through factoring,
four fairly distinct
psychological dimensions have been identified
for discussi,.on
concerning the primary influences operating
within I-level
classification, at least for the variables
considered in
the present study.
Salient loadings on Factor
of verbal

aiid

I

include the /ISC measures

performance I.Q.. as well as Hunt's measure

of cogTiltive complexity.

'This

was labeled for the present

study as a factor of general intelligence.

Factor II is primarily a rating factor, i.e.. all of
the items involving the observer ratings come together
in

this one factor.

This is further evidence for the lack of

discriminant validity of the rater variables, since if they
were discriminating sufficiently, each should load on one
of the other primary factors.

Hox^ever. Factor II may or may

not be artlfactual in the sense that the ratings may be

contaminated by some form of "halo" effect or by confusion
of the raters regarding the constructs, but they may just
as possibly represent a factor Important to I-level different-

iation which is not identifiable from the present data.

This

latter possibility cannot be discounted until proven otherwise.
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Table 12

FACTOR ANALYSIS:

ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX OF

ELEVEN DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Variable

Factor
TT
11

III

IV

.99

.15

.01

.09

70

.05

.27

-.01

I

1.

Verbal I.Q.

(v/ISC)

2.

Performance I.Q. (WISC)

3.

Locus of Control
(Rotter I-E Scale)

•

UN'

-.18

-.04

-.29

4.

Internalized Guilt
(Kosher Guilt Scale)

.02

-,04

.01

.93

Cognitive Complexity

.52

.18

.00

5.

(Hunt CC Measure)
6.

Foresight (Porteus TQ)

.Ik

13

.22

-.07

-.91

.01

.

-.03

7.

Impulse Control (Porteus

8.

Rated Locus of Control
(Behavioral I-E Rating)

.11

-.75

-.14

-.03

9.

Rated Internalized Guilt
(Behavioral IG Hating)

.09

.65

.18

.27

10.

Rated Cognitive Complexity
(Behavioral CC Rating)

.15

.90

.14

.00

11.

Rated Liking (Preference)

.09

-.04

.02

Q)

Factor III obtained salient loadings on
the Porteus
Maze measures of impulse control and
foresight.
This

x^as

identified as a factor of performance I.Q.,
or preferably
a more comprehensive label and related
to Vernon's hier-

archical model of intelligence reviewed
earlier, as a

spatial-practical-mechanical factor (Vernon, I965)
This
label is given added credence by the increased
loading
on Factor III of the '//ISC measure of performance
.

I.Q.

Factor IV, loaded most highly on the Kosher Guilt
Scale vilth a fair amount of loading on the Rotter

I-ii

measure, was identified as a factor of internalized

standards or values.

It is of interest that the rater

variable of internalized guilt also loaded fairly highly
on this factor, giving additional evidence for the con-

vergent validity of these two measures of guilt.

Among other considerations, the clustering of these
factors indicates that cognitive complexity covaries

verbal intelligence.

v^ith

In addition, due to the high loadings

of both of these constructs on Factor I, a further analysis

seemed appropriate in order to clarify the relative import-

ance of each in discriminating between I-level groups.

Discriminant P'unction Analysis of Dependent Measures
Kultiple discriminant analysis (Cooley and Lohnes,
1962) is a statistical technique for deriving linear combina-

tions of variables which yield the majcimum discrimination

among two or more groups.

A major advantage of this kind

of analysis in investigations such as the present one is

.
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that it may isolate combinations
of variables which discriminate among groups even in
cases where no single
variable is predictive.

In contrast to analysis of
variance in which each
predictor variable is treated separately
as a dependent
variable, and the F-test indicates
whether or not it
discriminated among groups, in discriminant
function
analysis predictor variables are examined
in company with
each other, and the unique contributions
to discrimination
are represented in discriminant weights.
In a general
way, discriminant functions are probably
more similar to

multiple regression equations than they are to
any other
statistical function. In the limiting case of
Urn

groups,

the discriminant function is virtually equivalent
to the

multiple regression equation

(VJaters, I970)

Suppressor influences are represented in a discriminant
function.

For example, if variables A and B both discriminate

between groups and for the same reason (i.e., represent
the same variance)

,

then the discriminant weight for the

one of these variables which discriminates best will be

large and the weight for the other will be small (perhaps
even negative)

.

The variance represented by the

variables is counted only once

— in

tiro

the variance which

represents it best.
These considerations mean, for instance, that if two
variables shovjed significant discrimination when each
considered separately by analyses of variance, it is

vias

.
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possible that only one would have a discriminant
weight of
noteworthy size. Only if both represented unique

contribu-

tions to the discrimination would both have
sizeable dis-

criminant weights.

Thus discriminant function analysis

might be seen In a sense as more economical In the
attempt
to Identify Important correlates of I-level. as
the technique

may "pull out" the most critical variables and thereby
pro-

vide a more compact or parsimonious account of variance due,
for example, to verbal I.Q. or cognitive complexity.
The statistical significance of the separation between
groups achieved by the discriminant may be tested by

calculating a value "V," based on the eigenvalue of the
discriminant, the number of groups, and the number of
variables; V is then referred to a chl-square table
(Anderson, I966).

The formula for V is:

V =

-

(N -

with N = total nmber of Ss,

number of groups, and

A

)

t =

= 1+^

logg

JN.

number of variables, g =
,

X

being the eigenvalue

(Anderson, I966)

Table 13 presents

the two discriminant functions

derived for the ten major dependent variables in this study
(again excluding delay of gratification).

The first discriminant provides 79.60 per cent of the
total variance in this data analysis.

The variable having

by far the largest vreight is instrument cognitive complexity.

The degrees of freedom appropriate to the statistic "V" for

3
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Table I3

DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION ANALYSIS OF
DEPENDEI-IT MEASURES

Variable
Plrst
Discriminant

Verbal I.Q.

1.

(v/isc)

Second
Discriminant

,03

.02

.02

-.01

« 04

.00

2.

Performance I.Q.

3.

Locus of Control
(Rotter I-E Scale)

^.

Internalized Guilt
(Mosher Guilt Scale)

.01

.00

5.

Cognitive Complexity
(Hunt CC Measure)

,98

-.90

6.

Foresight (Porteus TQ)

.01

.00

7.

Impulse Control (Porteus

-.02

-.06

8.

Rated Locus of Control
(Behavioral I-E Rating)

-.12

-.33

9.

Rated Internalized Guilt
(Behavioral IG xiating)

-.08

.02

0.

Rated Cognitive Complexity
(Behavioral CC Rating)

.10

-.26

(vjisc)

Eigenvalue

Proportion of Variance
Accounted for
F

df
P

Q)

1.0

79.60

8.15
20, 272
.001

0.26

20 AO

.
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the first discriminant, calculated
from the above mentioned
parameters, are (t + g - 2). where t =
the number of
variables and g = the number of groups.
For the seond

discriminant df = (t + g

-

i^,)

(Anderson, I966)

For the first discriminant, V =
92.35. df = 11. which
is significajit at the .001 level
(p < .001).

The second discriminant provides 20.^0
per cent of
the total variance in this analysis.
The largest weight is
again on the instrument variable of cognitive
complexity,
with rated locus of control and rated cogTiitive
complexity

carrying the next highest weights.
discriminant, V = 30.62, df =

9.

For the second

which is also significant

at the .001 level (p < .001).

There is little question from this analysis that Hunt's

measure of cognitive complexity is the best single predictor
of I-level classification among the variables investigated

in this study.

It was noted above that two variables could

each show significant discrimination when each was considered

separately by analysis of variance, and yet possibly only
one would have a discriminant weight of notable size.

The

present analysis illustrates and supports this contention
of the usefulness of discriminant function analysis as a

statistical technique for the present type of research
effort.

One further point which this analysis makes is that, in
a very real sense, the implied ordinal relationships betv/een
stages of I-level theory, i.e., that Level

2 <

Level

3

<
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Level k, is validated by the discriminant
function.
seen because the discriminant which best

This is

separates the three

I-level groups also indicates that the
groups occur along
its linear axis in the same ordering as
is posited by I-level
theory. This particular ordering did not
have to occur in
the analysis.
It appears from this that an implicit

validity of the ordering of the levels has been
demonstrated.
r-lultiple

Regres sion Ana.lysis .

As noted, for the

limiting case of two groups, discriminant function analysis
and multiple regression analysis are virtually Identical,
i.e., the pooled regression analysis for two groups can be

looked at as the same as a discriminant function analysis
for those groups.

Multiple regression is concerned with

the ability to predict from several variables considered

simultaneously.

It also illustrates the form of the rela-

tionship which occurs, and specifically, whether this

relationship can be approximated well by a linear function
In a problem in regression, one variable is

(Hays, 1963).

clearly the independent or predictor variable, the variable

manipulated or knoxvn first by the experimenter.

This

variable X is represented at several arbitrary values in
the experiment.

The only Interest here is in the possibility

and degree of linear prediction of Y from X.
If X is the score on a criterion variable and Yi, Y2

are predictor variables, then X is treated as a

sum of predictor variables, as in

Xi = wi Yi +

;.;2

Y2 +

.

.

.

ivjj,

Y^.

vj^eighted

.

.

.
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In the Simplest case there may be
only one predictor and
one criterion variate. The general
solution or model makes
no restriction on the kind of measures
used.
They may be
discrete, continuous, or dichotomous for
either type of

variable.

In general, for this model the unit
and origin

of both sets of variables is irrelevant
(Horst, I966)

The discriminant function analysis performed
above
was useful in obtaining information as to the
best discriminant for three I-level groups. The possibility
remained,

however, that for any two I-level groups the predictor
or

discriminant may not be the same as for all three groups
considered together.

In order to test this possibility,

multiple regression analyses were performed for I-level
groups 2 and 3 together, groups
groups

2

and ^ together.

3 and

^ together, and

The results of these analyses

are presented in summary form in Table 1^.
The F-ratio for multiple regression analyses is

calculated from the formula:
F =

(N-D-1)
P (1-^2)

...H^

where R 2 = the squared multiple correlations between the

criterion and predictor values, p = the number of predictors,
and N = the total number of subjects (adapted from ilnderson,
1966).

From the table it is seen that essentially four
predictors are discriminating differentially for the three
I-level groupings.
3,

For discriminating between Levels

2

and

cognitive complexity as measured by Hunt's test remains
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Table Ik
OF ANALYSES OF MULTIPLE
REGRESSION OF
ELEVEl^ DEPENDENT VARIABLES
ON I -LEVEL

CLASSIFICATION FOR THREE SETS OF
GROUPS

Variable

I--j-.evei

O

T

1-3
and
1-4

and.

.03

.34

.19

.

Co

.09

.27

.

Lc.

-.02

.00

.01

.00

and
T

Verbal I.Q.

1.

Performance I.Q.

2.
3.

^.
5.
6.

(-./isc)

(v/iSC)

Locus of Control (Rotter)

—

Internalized Guilt (Mosher^

Cognitive ComDlexity (Hunt)

Foresight (Porteus TQ)

Groups

T

1-2
™
•L

fc^

1-4

1

Q

C

(

.11

.07

-.06

.08

.14

-.17

-.04

-.12

-.23

-.01

-.20

•

7.

Impulse Control (Porteus

8.

Rated Locus of Control

9.

Rated Internalized Guilt

.02

-.03

.00

10.

Rated Cognitive Complexity

.01

.27

.10

11.

Rated Liking (Preference)

-.09

-.08

-.09

Multiple Correlation

.61

.62

.75

Standard Error of Estimate
for Standard Scores

.80

.78

.67

3.04

6.36

8.11

11. 58

11, 111

F
df

P

Q)

.01

.001

11.

71

.001
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a crucial variable, however
the wISC performance
measure
is an equally good predictor
for these two groups (i.e.,
contributes a similar amo-ont of
unique variance). Thele
two measures used in combination
would apparently be highly
effective in separating Level 2
and Level 3 youths. The
best predictive variable for
separation of Levels 3 and
however, is clearly verbal intelligence,
as measured by the
1/ISC.
It is Of interest to note that
the rating variable of
cognitive complexity is also sho.m
effective in distinguishing
between these two groups. For Levels
2 and 4, the best
discriminant is again the variable of
non-verbal or

performance Intelligence.

A caveat is in order here regarding the
interpretation
of regression equations.
The beta weights of
regression

equations are notably difficult to Interpret,
a situation
which is partly due to sampling limitations.
It is

knom,

for instance, that because of sampling
phenomena, beta

weights frequently lack stability in replication (Hays,
1963), a regretable circumstance due to the distribution of

correlations in the population.

This is particularly noted

when the predictor variables are substantially correlated
with one another, which is the case with these data.
With this in mind, the results of the regression analyses

cited will not be weighed too heavily.

However, in light

of these results and their similarity to the apparent

covarlance noted previously of verbal Intelligence and
cognitive complexity, a further analysis was performed.
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The practicality of considering at some length
the effects
due to cognitive complexity and verbal I.Q.
(perhaps best

predictors, as noted above, for Levels
3 and

^,

2 and

3,

and Levels

respectively) is fairly obvious to I-level

diagnosticians.

They have frequently shared the observa-

tion that the most difficult diagnoses (and
therefore the
most errors) are made in attempting to distinguish
between

Levels

3

and ^,

—

Comparativ e Analysis of Alternate Measures to
Classification
'

—

I -Level

The question must be raised as to how distinct the

I-level classification system actually is from the constructs
of verbal intelligence and cognitive complexity, constructs

which are purportedly relatively insignificant in determining I-level classification (iJarren. 1972).

This, too, is

a question of some practical relevance, since the I-level

diagnostic interview is a somewhat timely and costly
operation.

economical

It may vjell be expedient to find other, more
vrays of

arriving at the same classifications.

Table 15 presents a listing of the intercorrelations
of the dependent variables with I-level classification,

cognitive complexity, and verbal intelligence.

Table I6

presents a summary of the analyses of variance of the

dependent variables vath I-level, cognitive complexity,
and verbal intelligence, each treated separately as inde-

pendent variables.

Since the correlation coefficients

included some scores whose confornance to parametric
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Table I5

TABLE OF INTERCORRELATIOMS OF I-LSVEL.
COGNITIVE COMPLEXITY,
vase VERBAL I.Q. MiD THE DEPENDMT
VARIABLES
Hunt

IzLevel

Instruments

__CC_

Verbal
WISG
,

Verbal I.Q.

(

/isC)

Performance I. Q. (wiSC)

Locus of Control (Rotter

.57*^,

.53**

.Z^l^^,>

-.15

I— E)
Jv^^J!''^^^??^
(Kosher GS)

.58^^*

.02
*

^^^^^

.02

Cognitive Complexity

,

50**

-

*

15

^

.05

k^h^.
'-^^

(Hunt CC)

Foresight (Porteus TQ)

^^1^.,,

.32«-*

.19^^-

,i8*

-.37---^^

-.31*^^

-.23^^'--

_,4o**

-

29^-^^

- 21^^

,28**

.27**

IQ*
^

Cognitive ComDlexity
(Rated CC)

,42**

,29**

29**

Delay of Gratification

.15

.13

.12

.07

.14

.16*

Impulse Control (Porteus

Q)

Behavioral Measures

Locus of Control (Rated
I-E)

Internalized Guilt (Rated
IG)

(Feather)

Liking (Rated Preference)

Note.—

* p <

** p

<

.05
.01
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Table 16

SUMMRY OP

AI.ALYSES OF VARIAI.CE OF
DEPENDEI.T VARIABLES AS

FWICTION OF I-LEVEL, COGNITIVE
COMPLEX'ITY.

MJD Wise VERBAL I.Q.
Hunt

1-Level

Instruments

Verbal I.Q. (lasc)
Performance I.Q.

3^.53^^^^^ 32. 1?^^^*^^

(Viisc)

-

26.36*^^-^ I7.5I**-* 59.97-^-^^^^

Locus of Control (Rotter

1.68

0.6^

O.75

^

17^
^'^^

0 Pii
^'^^

Internalized Guilt
(Mosher GS)

,53

Cognitive Complexity
(Hunt CC)

32

Foresight (Porteus TQ)
Impulse Control (Porteus

Verbal
WISC

_cc_

Q)

^

oh co"^"2^.83--^—

23^"fr-«-i5•

7.68*-*

6.31^-^^-

11. 35^--**

13.5^^^'^^-*

11. 67***

6.02*^

I.9I

3.86-'^

5.83^^-2^

2.03
3.09^-

Behavioral Measures

Locus of Control (Rated
I-E)

Internalized Guilt (Rated

7.10^*

IG)

Cognitive Complexity

I5.O8***

(Rated CC)

Delay of Gratification
(Feather)

Note.

—

•"-

p <
p <
p <

.05
.01

.005

2.33

5.62

0.81

O.03
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assimptlons is somewhat questionable,
the reader will
probably want to place greater
reliance on the --values
reported, for which there Is no
question of violated parametric assumptions.
In treatlns cosnitive complexity
and verbal I.Q. as
independent variables for analysis with
the dependent
variables, it was necessary to assign
scores on these
measures to three groups which approximated
the original

distribution of subjects within I-level
groups.
on the H-unt CC measured rajiged from 0.00
to

Scores

2.00 and were

cut off at

tx7o

points in the distribution which approximated

as closely as possible the breakdox«7n in the
I-level dis-

tribution (1-2 = 15; 1-3 = 55; 1-4 = 68).

This breakdo.m

yielded a distribution for three groups with Ns of
20, 65,
and 53 (low. middle, and high CC, respectively). Verbal

intelligence groupings were

dram

from the extremes of the

verbal I.Q. scores in direct proportion to the I-level
distribution.

Thus, the lowest 15 scores were considered

to be a grouping of low verbal Intelligence, the highest
68 scores were labeled the high intelligence group, and the

remaining 55 scores, a middle intelligence grouping.

From Table 15 it is apparent that the intercorrelations
among the different variables are quite similar, and from

Table I6 it is shoxm that there is not a sizeable degree
of difference in the ability of I-level, cognitive com-

plexity as measured by Hunt's test, and the Verbal

,^'ISC

to separate groups on the dependent variables listed.

As

67

might be expected from the results
of the discriminant
function analysis, the measure of
cognitive complexity
reaches significance on all the
variables with which I-level
was sigTiificant, while verbal I.o.
obtains significance
on

all but two of the variables.

../hile,

as expected, the

F- values for I-level are generally
somewhat higher,

cognitive complexity does equally as well
as I-level
classification for separating groups on the
variables
of foresight and impulse control,
while verbal

I.Q. does

as well for instrument cognitive complexity
and the

behavioral measures of internalized guilt and
cognitive
complexity. It would appear from these data that
perhaps
a feasible alternative to the time-consuming
process of

the I-level interview, would be to use Hunt's
measure of
CC in combination with a measure of verbal intelligence

for obtaining I-level classifications.

Test of the Devil's Advocate Hypothesis
The Devil's Advocate hypothesis stated that when
system-atic group differences in intelligence are controlled,

all other differences -predicted between I-level groups

disappear

.

Prom the results of the previous analyses, and

specifically the strong effect shovm due to both verbal
intelligence and cognitive complexity on I-level classification, the test of this hypothesis vrould seem to be an

essential one as a final test of the construct validity
of I-level theory.

There is an additional reason for partialing
out the
effects due to intelligence. An obvious reservation

about

the Instruments selected for measuring locus
of control,

internalized guilt, cognitive complexity, foresight,
and
impulse control is that they are all paper- and- pencil
devices.

They are to be considered as validity criteria

for the interpersonal maturity construct, yet I-level is
measured by intensive clinical interview.

In one sense,

then, the written instruments constitute stringent tests
of validity because they are based on quite different

assessment procedures.

On the other hand, as noted above,

the Devil's Advocate hypothesis articulates the view that

I-level classification may reflect primarily intelligence,

which is well known to correlate highly with scores on
many written instruments.

In this sense the written

validity criteria might be contaminated
lenient

— through

— and

thus too

the mediation of intelligence.

Table 1? presents four sets of data:

first, the

original correlations between I-level and each of the

dependent variables; second., a presentation of the results
of a covariance analysis of the dependent variables against

I-level with verbal intelligence partlaled out; third, the
results of partialing out both verbal and non-verbal

Intelligence together; and fourth, the results when the
effects due to verbal intelligence, non-verbal intelligence,
and cognitive complexity are all partlaled out together.

-
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It is now time to lay the
Devil to rest.

The data

presented in Table 1? clearly indicate
that when the
effects of both verbal and non-verbal
intelligence are
removed from the dependent variables,
there still remains
a Significant relationship of the
instrument measured
constructs of cognitive complexity, foresight,
and impulse
control, as well as each of the three
constructs measured
by behavioral ratings (although these
are more difficult
to interpret) to I-level classification.
The same results
are true when Hunt's measure of cognitive
complexity
is

also removed.

A discussion of the implications of the

findings presented in this chapter follows immediately
below

Chapter VI

DISCUSSION
Due to the relative clarity of the results
as described
in the previous chapter, this discussion
will be primarily
directed toward briefly summarizing the results
of the

analyses and then considering some implications
of these
findings for I-level theory and classification.
I-level was unequivocally validated in respect to the

constructs of cog-nitive complexity, impulse control, and
foresight.

There was a slight trend for delay of gratifi-

cation to be significantly related to I-level classification;
however, due to the inadequate number of subjects in one of
the groups tested on this measure, these results cannot be

assigned too much importance.
of control

(

On the other hand, both locus

internal- external orientation) and internalized

guilt did not show a significant relationship to I-level,
and thus I-level theory was not validated in respect to

these constructs.

At the same time that I-level was validated for the
constructs of cognitive complexity. Impulse control, and
foresight, a highly significant positive relationship was

demonstrated between verbal and non-verbal (performance)

intelligence and I-level classification.

In addition,

further analyses indicated that of all the variables
Investigated, cognitive complexity
92

x^as

the best single

93

predictor or discriminator of I-level
classification.
However, even when the effects due to
intelligence and
cognitive complexity were removed from

the data, the con-

structs validated continued to maintain
their statistically
significant relationships to I-level
diagTiosis.
general,
it would seem reasonable to claim
that the present results
have validated I-level theory for certain
constructs

m

reputedly central in its formulation, have
not validated
it for certain other constructs, and that
there evidently
is more to I-level than caji be explained
by Intelligence
and/or cognitive complexity. Having made this
statement,
however, it must be conceded that all of the measures
in
this study which clearly validated the theory are tasks
that correlate with Intelligence to a considerable extent
(Porteus Mazes and sentence completions).

A related study recently brought to the attention of
the author, should be noted here.

Cross and Tracy (1971)

investigated the hypotheses that as interpersonal maturity

Increases

1)

Internal control will become stronger.

2)

time

perspective will be projected further into the future (this
is related to delay of gratification and foresight)
3)

guilt will increase.

and

,

The measures used to test these

three hypotheses were, respectively, the reverse form of
the Children's Locus of Control Scale (Blaler. I96I)

Future Events Test (Stein. Sarbln. and Kulik. I968)

,

,

the
and

the riosher Guilt Scale in combination with an eight-question

transgression interview, which was tape-recorded and later
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analyzed by a content analysis
and a global clinical
rating.
Their results substantiated
hypothesis one. but did not
support hypotheses two and three,
similar to the present
study, then. Cross and Tracy
also did not find a significant
relationship of l-level and Internalized
guilt; unlike the
present results, however, and using
a different measure,
they did show a significant
relationship between locus of
control and I-level (F = 3.^8. df =
1,

113.

p<.05).

it is

difficult to explain this difference
In the statistical
significance of the results of the two studies

and perhaps

additional research, utilizing both of these
measures of
locus of control, should be conducted.

Indeed, since one

of the ma.lor diagnostic indicants In the
I-level interview

for separating Level 3 and Level

L^r

is the judged presence

or absence of internalized controls or standards,
some further

Investigation of this construct seems appropriate.

This is

true particularly since the guilt measure used in
both
studies, which also should theoretically show differential

internalization, yielded results unequivocally not related
to I-level classification.

A few Informal observations regarding the results from
use of the Mosher Guilt Scale may be appropriate here.

The

first Is an observation of the characteristic response styles
of one of the subtypes within Level 4.

Labeled Neurotic-

Acting-out (NA) youths, a dominant characteristic of this
group (who comprise nearly half of the population of 1-4
juvenile offenders) is a tendency to deny categorically any

.
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feelings of inadequacy or inferiority.
8ruilt,

The feelings of

anxiety, and negative self-image are
theoretically

present within the 1-4 NA, however, an admission
of these
feelings will not readily be forthcoming. The
subtypes

within I-level classification (unlike the theory of
levels)
are said to be empirically derived, and if this
characteristic of the NA was indeed operating in the present
study,
it might help explain the lack of increased internalized

guilt as I-level increased

A further comment is directed to the Kosher Guilt
Scale itself,

llhile this Instrument has

been used success-

fully with delinquent populations (e.g., Ruma and Kosher,
1967), a glance at some of the items included and the

scorings applied to various choices raises the question
as to the appropriateness of this measure for use with the

relatively sophisticated youthful offender of today's
society.

As an example, for the stem "I regret

..."

the choices available are A. "my sexual experiences" or
B, "nothing I've ever done."

Choice A is scored +2 and

Choice B is scored -2 (a high score indicates more internal
ized guilt)

.

..."

For the stem "Women who curse

alternatives are A. "are normal" or

A is scored -1;

B, +2.

B, -2.

extreme cases and

"make me sick,"

"Sin and failure

the works of the Devil" or

A is scored +2;

B.

3.

the

.

.

."

A. "are

"have not bothered me yet."

Admittedly, these examples are

m-any of the

other items on Mosher's

scale are reasonable in content and scoring (see Appendix d

For future research on Internalized
guilt with juvenile
Offenders, however, perhaps
additional cr alternative
measures should be sought.

A final observation here relates
to both the Mosher
Guilt and Rotter I-e scales as
paper-and-pencil
forced-

choice instruments.

It was suggested earlier that
the

notable lack of discriminant validity
between these two
measures (r = .28. p < .01) may have
been because they
share the same test format. This
seemed a reasonable
speculation since the quite different
instrument measure
of cognitive complexity (sentence
completions) gave
evidence of excellent discriminant validity
with both the
Kosher and Rotter tests (r = .02 in each case).
The

inadequacies of paper-and-pencil instruments are
well
documented and the researcher who uses them does
so with
an awareness of the penalties which result from
the

additional error variance Introduced into his design.
However, particularly when forced-choice tests are admin-

istered to groups, it is very easy for individual subjects,

responding from a myriad of possible motivations, to respond
randomly or carelessly to the questionnaire items.

One of

these possible motivations has been colorfully coined by

Masling as the "screw you" effect, and the subjective
impressions of the experimenters and scorers of data in
the present study verified, the notion that certain juvenile

offenders may be particularly vrLlling to "screw" the

establishment-researcher-psychologist, who is perceived
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as imposing on their privacy and
"messing with their minds."
Several of the subjects did in fact
follow a strict "A, B,
A. B, etc." format throughout the
questionnaires. whil<.e

others were not as obvious as this but
the inconsistent,
".es
in the content of their responses
indicated a random selection
of the choices available.

The emphasis here is not to blame the
subjects who
responded in this manner, but rather to
point
out the

perhaps obvious fact that the probabilities
of this phenomenon
occuring are much less with instruments such
as Hunt's
sentence completion test, and even less with measures
such
as the individually administered Porteus Kazes.
It is not

insignificant to observe that the only major variables in
this study which did not obtain significance with I-level

were those measured by the forced-choice instruments.

This

may mean that the constructs of locus of control and
Internalized guilt are in fact not related to I-level as
the data indicate, or it may mean that the Instruments used

were not adequate (for the reasons noted above) for exploring this relationship sufficiently.

This problem is a

particularly difficult one for researchers of personality
since the problem is actually the historical question in

psychology of how to measure intei*nal constructs.

The

behavioral ratings used in this study were part of an
attempt to measure the youths* internalized guilt and

internal-external orientation in ways other than

vjith the

forced-choice instruments, yet the problems in Interpreting
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the ratings were seen clearly in the
previous chapter. An
immediate solution to this dilemna. of
course, is not
available; however, it is suggested that
future researchers
of the I-level construct search for
other available measures
of internalization, or develop and
validate new ones, which
would not be so susceptible to the extraneous
influences
discussed here, and which would therefore allow
for a more
definitive, more defendable test of the theory.

Discussion for the remainder of this paper will be
directed toward considering some implications of the
present findings for I-level theory as representative
of
the cognitive-developmental model, the relationship of

Intelligence and cog-nitive complexity to I-level theory,
some practical implications of utilizing alternative

measures of I-level classification, as well as suggested

directions for future research in this area.
Some Implications for I-Level Theory as an Example of th e
Cognitive-Developmental Approach to b'ocialization

In Chapter II a description was presented of the

assumptions common to cognitive-developmental theories
(of which I-level was shown to be representative).

One of

the general characteristics of cognitive stages was reported
to be the existence of an invariant order or sequence in

Individual development.

It was said, for example, that

cultural and environmental factors or innate potentialities
might cause any child or group of children to reach a

given level of development at a much earlier point in time
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tha^ another child or group;
but that regardless of
environmental teaching or lack of
teaching, all children should
still pass through the same
order of steps or levels of
development, stage notions are
essentially ideal constructs
designed, to represent differing
psychological organizations
at various points in development.
According to Kohlberg

(1969b), the stage doctrine
hypothesizes that these

qualitatively different types of
organization are sequentially
invariant, and therefore that the
developmental status of an
individual is predictable or cumulative
in the same sense

as continuity of position on an
ordinal scale.

I-level theory, as previously described,
postulates
seven successive stages of interpersonal
maturity. By
definition within the cognitive-developmental
model, the

stages are said to be invariantly ordered.

knowledge, however,

ajid

To this writer's

unlike the demonstrated empirical

invariance of Kohlberg 's stages of moral development
for
example, there has been no prior experimental
confirmation
of the presumed ordering of the levels of
interpersonal

maturity.

In the previous section it was seen that the

results of the discriminant function and multiple regression

analyses substantiated the postulated orderings of the
stages of I-level theory, at least for Levels

2,

3,

and ^.

The predictor variables which were found to best separate
these I-level groups also arranged themselves along a linear
axis in the same ordering as is presumed by the theory.

While determining the nature of this sequence was not part
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of the original design of this
experiment, the results do

indicate an additional aspect of
validation for the theory,
as well as lend increased support
for the
tenet of

invariant sequence embodied in the concept
of cognitive
stages.
In addition to these implications, it
was also noted

in Chapter II that cognitive-d evelopmental
theorists explain
basic development in terms of parameters
of organizational
wholes or systems of internal relations, and
thus when

describing social-emotional development emphasize
the
existence of a fundamental unity of personality organization and development knoim as the ego, or self,

while there

are various aspects of social development (moral development,

intellectual development, psychosexual development, etc.),
these aspects are said to be united by their common

reference to a single concept of self in a single social
x-jorld.

In other words, these theorists claim (see

especially Loevinger, I966) that in addition to the unity
of level of social development due to general cognitive

development, there is a further unity of development due
to a common factor of ego maturity.

Loevinger rather adamantly prefers to reserve the term
ego development for only "what is common to a certain

developmental sequence and a certain characterology that
applies almost independently of age level.

V/hat is

common

to the developmental sequence and the characterology is an

abstraction.

To this abstraction and only to this is the

.
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term ego development most
appropriately applied (Loevln.er.
1966. p. 196)..'
,he admits that her sug;,estion
to a.ply
the term ego development to
an abstraction rather
than to
the concrete stages of growth
observable In average
Children may seem strange at first,
but counters that this
is true in the accepted concept
of mental age.
Because
all aspects of growth are occuring
simultaneously
she

argues, some criterion other than
the normal sequence is
needed to distinguish physical growth
from intellectual,
or intellectual from moral, and so
on.
Further, what has
not been captured fully in any
exposition Is that the
diverse manifestations of aspects at each
stage of develop,
ment at once constitute a simple organic
unity and develop
through organically related steps. In other
words, all
these manifestations are part of a single
thing— a pervasive
thing that cannot reasonably be called less
theji ego develop-

ment.

i.'/hat

the organizing principle Is remains to be

clarified

Loevinger's approach is presented here In an attempt
to understand or at least conceptualize the results of
the

present study which indicated there is more to I-level
theory than can be explained by either intelligence or

cognitive complexity.

Her oim formulation of the stages of

ego development draws heavily from the work of Sullivan,

Grant, and Grant (whom she acknowledges have been concerned

with the abstract junction of a developmental sequence and
a character typology)

theory.

,

and is markedly similar to I-level

Loevlnger specifies for each of her
seven stages the
characteristic mode of impulse control
and character

development, of interpersonal relations,
and of conscious
preoccupation, including self-concept.
However, she makes
what she considers a crucial distinction
for measurement
in Viewing ego development as having
two quite different
types of manifestations— milestone
sequences and polar
aspects. Her stages are all characterized
in terms of
milestone sequences which are defined as
observable

behaviors that tend to rise and then fall off
in prominence
as maturity increases. As an example, she
cites conformity
to generally accepted social standards, which
becomes

Increasingly characteristic of behavior up to a point,
but beyond that point with increasing maturity becomes

progressively less compelling, though not necessarily
turning into nonconformity.

On the other hand, an example

of a polar aspect is tendency to stereotypy;

it constantly

and monotonically decreases with increasing ego level.

Polar aspects are generally more abstract traits and are

harder to judge than milestone sequences, since they must
be inferred from pattern s of observable behavior.

For

Loevinger, polar variables hold the key to uncovering the

unity due to ego development, while milestones are simply

variables along the way to some more comprehensive trait.
She would most likely Interpret the results of the present

study by saying "I told you so," meaning that most of the

variables investigated were merely manifestations of milestone
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sequences, that the

"

unexplainable" remaining significant

correlations after intelligence
and cognitive complexity
were removed reflected unobservable
polar aspects, and
might conclude with the warning
that an approach to personality study that is at once
behavioristic and quantitative
cannot possibly discover or
reconstruct the variables
central to development.

Ker comments on the use of factor

analysis, as related to this last
point, are presented in
Appendix M.

Loevinger»s beliefs about the nature of
ego develop,
ment and the proper study of this area
of investigation,
while considered rather extreme and untenable
by some

critics, deserve consideration.

There is certainly nothing

m

her exposition which is incompatible with the
assumptions
adhered to by the cognitive-developmental theorists.
In
any case, it seems worthwhile to consider her "interpretation" of the results of the present study as a thought-

provoking, if not a reasonable, explanation.

An alternative,

though related, hypothesis to Loevinger's is offered in the

following discussion of intelligence, cognitive complexity,
and I- level.

Intelligence, Cognit ive ComTPlexity. and I-Level
In the hypotheses presented in Chapter III, a significant

positive relationship was predicted between intelligence and
I-level, as well as between cognitive complexity and I-level.

Several studies reviewed (see especially Zaidel, 1970) had

shown strong relationships between I-level and intelligence.

While the content of the theory
itself was sho.^ to Indicate
fairly clearly that a significant
relationship of each of
these two variables to I-level
should not be surprising.
What is surprising, then, is
not that
these predicted rela-

tionships were confirmed, or even
that this confirmation was
so unequivocal, but rather
that for years the founders
and
developers of I-level, publicly at
least, have minimized
the effects of intelligence and
cognitive complexity on Ilevel. preferring rather to emphasize
the personality
variables and interpersonal aspects of
the
theory.

In reality, it is not quite so easy
to separate
intelligence from personality variables or
social development, although it is imder stand able that
developers of a
new theory of personality development would
wish to present
their formulation as something more than a
restatement of

the intelligence or abilities llteratiAre.

Apparently.

I-level does involve something more than intelligence,

sjid

it would seem that some recognition of the crucial
role

intelligence plays in the development of interpersonal

maturity would not detract from the attractiveness of the
theory as presented by its proponents.
The cognitive-developmental approach to socialization

makes the assumption that social development is cognitively
based since any description of shape or pattern of a
structure

cf

social responses necessarily entails some

cognitive dimensions. A description of the organization
of the child's social responses involves a description of
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the way in V7hich he perceives, or conceives, the
social
world and the way in which he conceives himself.

This

last sentence Is practically a verbatim statement of the

basic focus of I-level as presented In Chapter II, where
It was said that the theory "focuses upon the ways In

which the Individual is able to see himself and the world,
and the ways he is able to Interpret what is happening
betvreen himself and others."

Af^aln, as a theory of inter-

personal maturity within the framework of the cognitive-

developmental approach, this similarity of focus of the
"t^wo

models is certainly appropriate, at the same time as

it serves to underline the rationale for the results

the present study which show not only a

hi/7;h

in

correlation

of level of coPTiitive complexity with I-level, but of the

variables included for study, that cognitive complexity
is the best single predictor of I-level classification.

Empirically, Kohlberg notes that the cognitive-

developmental approach is derived from the observation that
the most prominent and clear changes in the psychological

development of the child are co.gnitive, in the sense of
mental age or I,Q.

Indeed it has been shovm that the

Influence of Intelligence on the social attitudes and

behavior of children is such that it has a greater number
of social-behavioral correlates than any other single

observed aspect of personality (Cattell, 1957).

In terms

of prediction, the longitudinal study by Anderson mentioned

earlier, offers this summary:
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surprised at the emergence of
^v.
.
t
the intelligence
factor in a variety of our
instrument, (family attitudes,
responsibility
and maturity, adjustment) in
SDite'of our
attempts to minim.ize intelligence
in selecting;
our personality measures. Ilext ue
were
prised that for prediction over a long surtime,
the intelligence quotient seems to
carry a
heavy predictive load in most of our
measures
of outcome.
It should be noted that in a
number of studies, adjustment at both the
child and the adult level, whenever
intelligence
IS included, emerges as a more significant
than personality measures (Anderson, i960, factor
p. ^93).
It seems evident that the power of I.Q.
to predict social

behavior comes from many sources, including the
social and
school success experiences associated with
"brightness."

However, apparently a large part of the predictive
power
of I.Q. also derives from the fact that more rapid
cogTiitive

development appears to be associated with more rapid social
development.

This interpretation of I.Q. effects was

documented in an interesting study by Kohlberg and Zigler
(1967) of the sex-role attitudes of bright and average

boys and girls.

Among other findings, their study indicated

that while there were marked and similar developmental

trends for both bright and average children, these trends

were found to be largely determined by mental as opposed to
chronological age,

V/hen

parallel curves of age-development

were plotted for both groups, the curves were found to be

approximately two years advanced for the bright children,
who were about two years ahead in mental age.

For example,

the authors note that bright boys would shift from a pre-

ference for adult females to a preference for adult males
on experimental and doll-playing tests at about four years

.
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of age, whereas the averaP:e
boys would make this shift at
about Six years. Kohlberg cites
the findings of a similar

study in Which retarded and average
lower-class boys were
divided into two groups:
father-absent and father-present.
The average boys made the shift to
the male at 5-6. and the
retarded boys at age 7-8. clearly
these findings indicate
that sex-role developmental trends are
mediated by intelligence, and it seems feasible to presime
that interpersonal
maturity development is similarly mediated
by intelligence
or level of cognitive complexity.

Carrying this discussion of I-level and
cognitive
complexity and intelligence into another area of

comparison,

a major diagnostic indicant within the I-level
interview
is the sophistication of youths in ability to
perceptually

differentiate between people in their environment.

Questions

such as "How is your Mother different from other mothers?"
and "What kind of people do you prefer as friends?" are

asked the interviewees in order to determine the extent to

which they differentiate what they see in their world.
VTlthin the cognitive-developmental model, constructs such

as "differentiation" are regarded as structural components

of development and as such are considered to characterize

every aspect of the personality:

the social- emotional

the perceptual, and the intellectual.

There is research

which indicates that differentiation is quite highly
correlated

x-Jith

standard psychometric measures of intelligence

as v^ell as with a variety of social attitudes and traits.
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Those readers familiar with the original
presentation of the
theory of Harvey, Hunt, and Schroeder (I96I)
will recognize
the similarity here to their view of personality
as

increased structural

d

if f erentation and integration of

conceptions of self and others, which implies both
cognitive
and attitudinal correlates.
It will be remembered from the description
in Chapter
II,

that the development of cognition and the
development

of affect were said to be parallel.

Clearly, this is not

to say that cognition determines affect and behavior, but

rather that the development of the two has a common structural base.

It was pointed out, directly above, that a

structural dimension of development such as "differentiation"
Is considered to characterize every facet of the personality,

and that a sig-niflcant positive relationship has been found

both between differentiation and Intelligence, and differ-

entiation and social traits.

If differentiation is a basic

structural component common to the development of both

intelligence (cognition) and social traits (affect), then
It does not seem unreasonable to suggest again, not that

I-level stages are cognitive, but rather that interpersonal

development also has a basic structural component.

In other

words, in the same way in vrhlch the development of cognition

and affect were said to have a common structural base, so
it is suggested that the development of interpersonal

maturity (which has both co.gnitlve and affective aspects)
also has a basic underlying structural component (which may.
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or

my

not. be differentiation).

While social- emotional

components are certainly involved
in interpersonal develop,
ment, it is suggested that the
development of these affects
is largely mediated by changes
in thought patterns, or
cognitions.

Accepting this extrapolation for a moment,
an implication of this position would be that an
empirical correlation
should be expected between interpersonal
maturity and
aspects of cognitive development which are
not specifically

considered to be aspects of interpersonal
maturity.

The

correlations cited in the literature between
I-level and
intelligence, rajiglng from .30 to .59. indicate
that interpersonal maturity has a cognitive base, but is not
simply

general verbal intelligence applied to social situations
or

relationships.

Perhaps another way, then, of explaining

the results discussed above from Loevinger's point of view,
is that what was left when the correlations in this study

were controlled for intelligence, was reflective of a
basic structural component, a base common to the develop-

ment of both cognition and interpersonal maturity.

In fact,

It seems com.patible theoretically to assert that in

Loevinger»s belief (that the further unity of development
due to a common factor of ego maturity can only be meaning-

fully understood as an abstraction), her term' "abstraction"
is in actuality nothing more, or less, than the basic

cognitive-developmental notion of this common structural
component in social development.

This component may be
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the orsanlzlns principle of
ego development which
Loevln.er
said was yet to be clarified.
Whatever oommunallty, or
lack Of It. is involved here In
these positions. It seems
relatively safe to say as an
Interpretation of the present
results within this theoretical
framework, that cognitive
complexity Is a necessary, but not
a sufficient, condition
for Interpersonal maturity.

Interpretlnp; the results of the present
study as having-

shown construct validation for I-level
theory, or at least
for certain aspects of the theory, leads
to the question
of what was learned from the data regarding
the classification of youths within this system, and
therefore to what
are the implications of these results for
future I-level

classification.

From the analyses of the data it was seen that
Hunt's
measure of cognitive complexity was a highly significant
predictor of I-level classification, accounting for 80 per
cent of the variance in the discriminant function
analysis
of the dependent variables.

A factor analysis of the variables

studied revealed that four fairly distinct, psychological

dimensions exerted the major Influence on I-level diagnosis.
These four factors were identified as general intelligence,

spatial-practical-mechanical intelligence, internalized
standards or values, and a factor of behavioral ratings.
(It might be noted here that v/hen the rater variables are

Ill
excluded from the factor analysis,
a three-f actor solution
is obtained which extracts the
same first three factors
identified here, but x.ith higher
loadings on the salient
variables and corresponding greater
contributions to total
variance from the three factors tha^
in the solution
including the behavioral ratings.)
it was also demonstrated in several comparative analyses
that using Kant's
measure in com.bination with a measure
of verbal intelligence
would be an effective way of classifying
youths for I-lev.^.I.
viith

little, if any. corresponding loss of
predictive power.

becomes apparent when the results of these
analyses
are considered together is the consistent
manner in which
intelligence (both verbal and performance) ajid cognitive
l-;hat

complexity either covary with one another in accounting
for
group differences, or alone are fairly powerful predictors
of I-level classification.

In the discussion above some

theoretical and empirical evidence

V7as

offered to explain

why these strong relationships would occur.

The inevitable

logical conclusion, however, is that a practical alternative
to the I-level diagnostic interview for procuring I-level

classifications, would be the use of perhaps a combination
of validated measures of verbal and performance intelligence
and cognitive complexity.

Considering what is involved in the I-level interview,
at first glance this conclusion would seem practically

irrefutable.

A trained I-level diagnostician initially

sxiends an average of

an hour- and -a- half in an intellectually

demanding interview situation in which the task is to
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determine the perceptual level and
characteristic response
style (I-level and subtype)
of the youth being classified.
The interview is tape-recorded
and diagnosed by a second
trained rater who then shares his
diagnostic impressions
With the interviewer, if disagreement
exists
in the two

diagnoses, the usual procedure is for
both raters to relisten to the interview in an attempt
to resolve their

differences.

The diagnostic process itself for
each youth,

then, requires at least three hours of
trained staff time,
and may demand as much as six hours in some
cases. As

might be expected, the training required to
reach an

acceptable level of diagnostic accuracy or reliability
Is necessarily long and costly in staff time
and energy.

Warren and her staff at the Center for Training in
Dif f erential Treatment in Sacramento recommend an initial

intensive five- week training course in I-level theory,
diagnosis, and treatment, follov/ed by 30 to 50 additional

interviews as the minimal requirement for becoming a

proficient I-level diagnostician.
This description of what is involved in arriving at
an interview I-level diagnosis in combination with the

suggestion that equally discriminative diagnostic distinctions could be derived, by group administration and simple

scoring of several measures of I.Q. and cognitive complexity, provides a rather dramatic picture of the issues
involved here.

Clearly the question becomes:

VJhy

would

anyone continue to use the former procedure when the
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latter has been satisfactorily
demonstrated to classify
at least as well?
In the woriang draft of a
paper on the advantages and
disadvantages of two current systems
for classifying the
juvenile offender, presented to
agencies within the
Colorado Division of fouth Services,
the present writer
emphasized the point that .-in deciding
upon which measures
one wants to use In gathering data
for diagnostic purposes,
it is first necessary to ask what
kind of information
is

needed for what specific reasons
(Killer, I972, p. 16)."
The example was offered of the situation
where an agency
staff makes the decision that they want
to classify their
intake population in ways which will
provide groupings for
the effective management of wards within
an institutional
setting.

It was noted that the amount and type of
informa-

tion needed in this situation would probably
be quite

different, for instance, from the information needed
by
a different agency where it is decided to classify
youths

into groups that would maximize the effectiveness of

intensive treatment, on a long-term basis, in the community.
This point is obviously relevant to the present

discussion,

'.j'hile

one common product of both the I-level

interview and the alternate much simpler, less costly
procedure suggested here vjould be the I-level diagnosis,
the amount and kind of information obtained in the process
of procuring the diagnosis would differ substantially for

each method.

The alternate method would also provide

an intelligence quotient, an indicant of level of cognitive
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complexity, and perhaps some additional
scores of mechanicalspatial-practical abilities. In contrast, the
I-level
interview, in the process of determining a
diagnosis,

elicits a wide range of content within a large
number of
areas related to each youth (e.g., family,
peers,

school,

reasons for delinquency, goals, self -concept

.

etc.).

expressed in the youth's own idiosyncratic style
and from
his own frame of reference.

These differences between the

two diagnostic methods regarding the end-products
obtained

are certainly not necessarily good or bad in and of themselves.

Rather, again, the point for emphasis is that the

method chosen should directly reflect the determination of

what data are needed to optimize the probabilities for

meeting the specified goal(s) of a specified program in
the most efficient

v/ay

possible.

Some additional practical considerations inherent in
this choice of methods would necessarily involve questions
of staff availability and limitations, as x^ell as size of

intake load (i.e., is it necessary for us to be able to

classify groups of youths at one time, or is it possible
and feasible for us to do individual evaluations?

;

how much

time (actual hours) can we devote to procuring a diagnosis

for each individual?; how much time and money can we
afford for training, etc.?).
It is the experience of the writer that most I-level

treatment agents would probably argue that they need the

additional and varied information elicited in the

interviex*;
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order to develop and
Implement an Individualized
trent-ent Plan for each youth,
and that having only
an 1-level
diagnosis and an Intellective-cognitive
assessment would
not be sufficient. Thus,
they probably would
categorically
reject the sugsestion to
utilize the alternative method
to Classification offered
here.

A rejection of the alterna-

tive method is certainly
Justifiable if the decision to
do
is
rigorously assessed within
30
similar guidelines as
those noted ir^ed lately above.
However, having developed
individualized treatment plans based
on Infomatlon obtained
from the I-level interview, and
then working with Juvenile
offenders within the I-level treatment
model, the present
writer seriously doubts that this
argument for not using
the alternate method of diagnosis
could be empirically
substantiated. This is not to say that
the I-level treatment model is invalid or ineffective
for working with

youth offenders.

Rather, it is suggested that the
additional

information gained from the interview probably
contributes
nonsignificantly to successful treatment outcome
with
these youths, and that whatever treatment
gains were
identified would be shown to be a factor of the
differential

treatment strategies developed from knowledge of the
I-level

diagnosis alone.

Of course another possibility Is that

when the data from definitive I-level treatment outcome
studies are in, the Devil will rise from his resting place
and smile with the knowledge that Intelligence effectively

explains the differential results.
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In statlnp; above that the
present results had validated
I-level theory for certain constructs
and not for certain
others central to its formulation,
a qualifier was added
Which noted that all of the measures
used which clearly
validated the theory also correlate
fairly highly with
mtelli.c^ence.
Similarly, all of the strictly
non-intellectual
behavioral tests used were shorn to be
mostly unproductive

for additional validation of the theory.

It is su;.gested

,

then, that further research in this
area should strive for

operations to test the validity of I-level
that are less
correlated with or mediated by intelligence.
Such an
effort would provide a more definitive test
of the theory,
and would consequently allow for more definitive
statements

regarding its validity.
In addition. I-level theory is said by its proponents
to be a theory of personality development in
general, with

applications for delinquency.

In other words, the levels

within I-level theory putatively pertain to the entire
normal population, while the subtypes within the levels
have been derived from observations of the population of
juvenile offenders.

In a certain sense, then, it could

be said that the present study has not satisfactorily

demonstrated the validity of this theory, since the

population sampled represents a relatively specific and
limited sub-gTouping of the total population which the

theory purports to describe.

A crucial next step in the
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validation Of I-level theory,
therefore, would be either
to replicate the present
study or design a somewhat
similar
one to InTestlsate the
validity of I-level with a
nondelinquent adolescent population.
To this point. l-level
research has been performed
exclusively with

juvenile
Offenders and no evidence of its
supposed relevance to the
normal population has been
demonstrated.

Chapter VII
SUI4MAiiY

The Interpersonal Maturity
Level (I-level) Classlflcatlon System has been in use for
a number of years to
classify juvenile offenders for
the purpose of differential
treatment, while predictive research
had been conducted
for assessing- the effectiveness of
the differential

treatment strategies applied as a
result of I-level
classification, little effort had been
directed toward

validating the actual theory underlying the
classifications.
The present study, then, was designed and
carried out to

Investigate the construct validity of I-level
theory.
Six measurable constructs were determined
to be

among those central to the theory:

cognitive complexity,

internal- external locus of control, internalization
of

standards or values (internalized guilt), delay of
gratification, impulse control, and foresight or the ability
to plan behavior.

A total of 138 subjects obtained from

three correctional settings were divided into groups on
the basis of their I-level classification, yielding the

following three groups:
at Level

2

15 youths diagnosed as functioning

(1-2), 55 youths at Level 3 (1-3). and 68 at

Level 4 (I-^).

These subject groups were used in the

majority of analyses xvhlch tested the follov;ing hypotheses:
118

;
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Youths at higher levels of
interpersonal maturity:
1) are more internally oriented in relation
to control of
their lives, i.e., they are more
inclined to interpret
important reinforcements as consequences
of their oim
behavior rather than due to extrinsic
factors in
the

envi ronment

are more cognitively complex than those
at lower levels
of development;
2)

3)

have internalized their

om

standards and values and

therefore experience greater internalized guilt
than youths
at lovjer levels;
^)

have greater impulse control than youths at lower
levels

of development;
5)

are more able to delay gratification than youths at

lower levels;
6)

possess greater ability to exercise foresight and plan

behavior; in addition,
7)

there is a significant positive relationship between

I-level diagnosis and verbal intelligence;
8)

there is a significant positive relationship between

I-level diagnosis and non-verbal intelligence;
9)

Devil's Advocate HyTPothesis

'..'hen

:

systematic group

differences in Intelligence are controlled by matching or
statistical procedures, all of the differences predicted
in the first six hypotheses disappear.

Analyses of variance

x-jere

used to initially test

these eight principal hypotheses.

The results confirmed

.
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that youths at higher levels of
Interpersonal maturity are
more cognitively complex (as measured
by Hunt's Paragraph
completion Kethod
have greater impulse control (as
measured by the Porteus Mazes
Q Score), and possess greater
ability to exercise foresight and plan
behavior (as measured
by the Porteus Mazes TQ Score). At
the same time,
)

,

a

highly significant positive relationship
was found to
exist between I-level and both verbal and
non-verbal
(performance) I.Q. (as measured by the iJISC)
On the other hand, the hypotheses x^re not
confirmed
that youths at higher levels of interpersonal
maturity
are more internally oriented in relation to
control of

their lives (as measured by the Potter I-E Scale),
or that
they experience greater internalized guilt (as measured
by
the Nosher Guilt Scale).

Delay of gratification (as

measured by Feather's Choice-of-Prizes Test) showed a
slight tendency to be related to I-level, hovjever, the
small number of subjects available on this measure in one
of the groups (1-2), made it difficult to consider these

results as additional validation for I-level theory.

Alternate measures of cognitive complexity, locus of
control, and internalized g-uilt used in the study

xjere

behavioral ratings of these constructs obtained from houseparents, cottage counselors, and caseworkers who were

familiar

x-jith

the youths Included for study.

of variance of these ratings

relationships

betx'7een all

shox-red

Analyses

highly significant

three of these constructs and

I-level classification, however,
multitralt-nultimethod
matrix analysis pointed to the
extremely low discriminant
validity of the behavioral ratings.
Subsequent analyses
were performed to remove the effects
due
to the raters'

preference or personal liking for the
youths, as well as
the effects due to intelligence and
level of cognitive
complexity, in order to assert the basis
for the rater
Judgments and their lack of discriminant
validity. From
these ajialyses it was concluded that the
rating data
supported the validity of I-level theory in
a general way
because the correlations were not artif actual,
but hardly
indicated much specific validity for the constructs
under

consideration.

In the test of the Devil's Advocate hypothesis,

differences across groups in intelligence were removed

from the data, with the result that each of the relationships between cognitive complexity, im^pulse control, and

foresight and I-level continued to be significant.
this hypothesis

x<ras

not confirmed.

Thus,

It is necessary to

point out, however, that all of the measures in this study
that validated I-level theory (Hunt's sentence completion
test, Porteus mazes Q and TQ scores) substantially reflect

intelligence, which leads to an emphasis of the cognitive

aspects of I-level classification, as contrasted with the

interpersonal and characterological aspects featured by the
system's architects.
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A discriminant function analysis of
the data Indicated
that Of all the variables included
for study, hunt's measure
Of cognitive complexity was the
best single predictor of
I-level classification, accountins for
80 per cent of the
total variance. ?actor analysis of
the data revealed four
m:aJor factors operating within I-level
classification in this
study:
general intelligence, spatial-practical-mechanical

intelligence, internalized standards or values,
and a
factor of behavioral ratings. Comparative
analyses indicated
that using a combination of measures of
intelligence
and

cog-nitive complexity woiild provide a more
parsimonious

and equally powerful predictor of I-level
classification
as the standard I-level diagnostic interview.

These results were discussed in terms of the measures
used (particularly emphasizing the difficulties with forced-

choice Instruments in m.easuring Internal constructs)

,

some

implications for I-level theory as an example of the cognitive-

developmental approach to socialization (suggesting that
cognitive complexity is a necessary, but not sufficient,

condition for interpersonal maturity development)

,

and some

practical implications for the use of alternate measures to
I-level classification, noting that what method of diagnosis
is used depends largely on the amount and kind of information

needed to optimize the probabilities for meeting the specified
goal(s) of a specified program.

Suggested directions for

further research included searching for operations to test
the validity of I-level which are not correlated with or
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mediated by intelligence, and also the necessity
for designing and performing studies to investigate the
validty of
I-level theory with a non-delinquent adolescent
population.
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INTEGHATION-LEVEL INTBRVIEW SCHEDULE
I.

Expectation of
Youth Authority

i.

2.
3.

4.
5.
II.

Attitudes toward
offense and
detention

1.
2.

3.

k.
5.

rthat do you think it's
going
to be like in the Youth"

Authority?
what have you heard about it?
How do you feel about being
sent here?
VJhat do you think they are
trying to do to (for) you?
What should they be trying to

How did you happen to get in
trouble?
What kind of boys (girls) do
you like to be around in here?
Why?
What kind do you stay away
from? Why?
What staff people do you like
to be around?
Why?
What staff people do you avoid?
Why?

III.

Family (Parents,
siblings, wife,

1,

etc.)

2.
3.

4.

IV.

Attitudes toward
father (or substitute)

1.

2.
3.

4.
5.
6.

7.
8.

How do your folks feel about
your trouble?
How do you feel about their
reactions?
Do they hold it against you?
Do you want them to visit you?
Will they?
kind of man is your father?
What is he like? How did you
feel about him when you were
growing up? How do others feel
about him?
What do you admire most in your
father?
What do you dislike the most?
(Cr like least?)
How do you feel about his
discipline?
What do you figure makes him
tick?
Do you think you take after him?
How are you different from him?
Are you Incluenced by him in
any way? Why?
Who do you take after in your
family?
What are his ideals? What does
he believe in?
'•/hat
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Attitudes toward
mother (or substitute)

i,
2

3.

4.
5.
6.

7.

8.

Handling problem
and affectivity

(V/henever you get
strong feelings
from the subject
in any area, ask
him how he thinks
other people feel
about it.)

1.

3.

5,
6.
7.
8.
9.

10.

11.
12.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

.-.'hat kind of a
woman is your
mother? What's she like?
.-/hat do you admire
most in
your mother?
What do you dislike most?
(Or like least?)
How do you feel about her
discipline?
What do you figure makes her
tick?
Do you think you take after
her? Or are you influenced by
ner in any way? why?
What are her ideals? what
does she believe in?
Has your attitude toward
either parent changed in any
way? How?

Are you the sort of person
who gets strong feelings about
things or would you say you are
more easy-going?
What happens when you have
strong feelings ?
How about when you really get
Q^-?Ty at someone?
(Do you
hold a grudge?)
What do you do when you really
feel blue or down in the dumps?
What usually makes you feel
that way?
Have you ever been really happy ?
What made you feel that way?
How do you express it?
Do you remember the time you
were the most frightened?
Are there things that still
frighten you as an adult?
What do you usually do when you
get into a tight spot?
What happens when you get real
upset?
How do you go about getting people
to do things for you?
Do you drink? How much? How
often?
How do you act when you've had
a lot to drink?
'What do you get out of drinking?
Do you see the drinking as a
problem to yourself? To others?
What do you consider your strong
points? (Pressure)

.

13^
19.

20.

VII.

VIII.

Self

1,

What kind of person are you?
Describe yourself as a third
person would

Work and /or
school and

1.

Are you the type that like to
plan for the future or take
things as they come? V/hy?
How do you feel about going to
school? Why?
What do you like about school
(most, least)?
What kind of teachers are best?
Worst?
What do you want to be when you
are grown?
How can you make this possible?
What kinds of work have you
done?
Did you like it? Why? Why not?
Would you rather work or go to
school?

f ut ure
2.
3.

(Try to establish
reality of plans.)

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

IX.

What are the things about yourself that you don't like?
(Pressure)
What do you usually do about
them?

Friends and
others

1,
2.

3.

5.
6.
7.
8.

9.

How important do you think
friends are? Why?
What sort of people do you
prefer as friends? Why?
How do you go about choosing
a friend?
When you meet somebody for the
first time, what things about
him would make you want him for
a friend?
what kind of people do you find
objectionable? Why?
When you meet a person, what
things would make you dislike him?
Are there lots of people you
dislike?
Do you have a large or small
group of friends?
Do you have any especially close
frl ends?

10.

Are some of your friends closer
friends than others, or are they
all about the same? What makes
the difference whether a person
is a close friend or just an
average friend? Is it just a
matter of hov; long you have
known him?
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11.
12.

13.

Have you made any friends
since
you«ve been here? (Location)
Do you think you will make
friends here?
What kind of people do you
admire? wish to be like? most
Ever
have
a hero?

X.

Girlfriends,
boyfriends,
dating

1.

2.
3.

^.

How about women (men)? How
do
you feel about them*^
What kind 0^ girl (boy) do
you
like most?
What kind of girl (boy) don't
you like?
How important do you feel dating
Is?

XI.

Marriage

5.

How will you feel about being
away from girls (boys) while you
are in Youth Authority?

1.

How do you feel about marriage?
(Your parents' marriage?)
How do your parents get along
with each other?
What about marriage for yourself?
How would you run a family?
What should a husband do for his
family?
What should a wife do for her
family?
Who should discipline the kids?
How about working wives?
Where have you gotten your ideas
about marriage?
What do you think is the most
Important in making a marriage
work?

2.

(Handle this
area especially
according to age
level.)

3.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

10.

XII.

Present mental
health

1.
2.
3.

XIII.

Maturity

1.

2.

(If he says he's

not mature, ask
in what ways he is.)

3.

How has your health been recently?
How do you sleep nights? Any
trouble getting to sleep?
Do you have any dreams or nightmares?
Have you been nervous or upset
very much? Do you consider yourself to be a nervous person?
V/hat do you consider to be a
mature adult, groim-up person?
How would you describe him?
How can you tell what a mature
person is like? (Get specific
behavioral details.)
How does a mature person get
that way?
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5.

6.
7.

XIV.

Interview

1.

2.
3.

^.

Do you consider yourself
mature?
In what ways do you consider
yourself not mature? (Elaborate)
How important is it to be
mature?
liovi about change?
I'/hy?
Do
people ever really change
once they are adults? How
about you?
(Get details.)

We've talked a great deal about
the way you feel about various
people and things. I wonder if
we could spend some time
discussing your feelings about
what we were doing,
what did
you think as we were talking,-?
How did you feel?
(Elaborate)
Any questions make you feel
imcomf ortable?
'do\t did you want the interview
to go?

5.

6.

XV,

Interviewer's
impression

1.

(To be dictated
after subject's
departure)

2.

3.

Warren (I966)

what was the point of the interview? i;/hat did we seem to be
after?
How did I seem to be feeling
during the time? Why v/as that?

How did he behave? (Elaborate
postural cues, amount of
psychomotor activity, tics,
mannerisms, restlessness, etc.)
How did the interviewer feel?
(Did he feel as though he were
pulling teeth, relaxed, v;arm
feelings, angry, comfortable,
uncomfortable, etc.)
What are your immediate impressions
of this person's "I" level?
why?

APPENDIX B
Rating Scales of Youths' InternalExternal F
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BATING SCALES OF YOUTHS
1.

«

INTERl^AL-EXTEHNAL FOCUS

This youth feels that no matter
what he (she) does, it
won»t make any difference because
powerful forces or
other people control his (her) life
anyway.

H^t-it-^1
2.

somewhat

extremely

This youth feels that there are any
number of alternatives
available to him (her) in deciding the
direction of his
(her)

own life.

not at all

3.

hardly

hardly

somewhat

^[Iliti

extremely

This youth seems to feel that everything that
happens to
him (her) is the result of luck, chance, or
fate.

not at all
^.

hardly

somewhat

quite

extremely

This youth behaves as if he (she) is completely at the

mercy of others around him (her).

not at all

hardly

somewhat

quite

extremely

APPENDIX
fiatlng Scales of Youths'
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C

Cognitive Complexity

1^0

RATING SCALES 0? YOUTHS'
COGNITIVE COMPLEXITY
1.

This youth would be able to
understand me even if
talked about some rather
complicated

I

areas.

""^^

2.

^

^iliti

i5^tremel y

hardly

somewhat

^HTi

extremely

This youth needs to have things spelled
out for him (her)
over and over again before he (she)
is able to grasp
what is being said.

not at all
4.

i^Si^miS

This youth appears to be spontaneous
and flexible in
his (her) approach to solving
problems.

not at all
3.

^^^^

hardly

somewhat

quite

extremely

This youth seems to be limited in his (her) ability
to
see alternative ways of dealing with various
situations.

not at all

hardly

somev/hat

quite

extremely

APPENDIX D

aatlng Scales of Youths' Internalized
Guilt

1^1

EATING SCALES 0? YOUTHS'
INTEHMALIZED GUILT
1.

When this youth oo^lts a
wrong act. he (she) feels
genuinely miserable Inside.

^^^^
2.

^^tF^

If this youth were certain
he (she) would not get
caught, he (she) would not
hesitate to steal some

money that was lying on a nearby
table.

not at all
3.

i^Si^b

iitFiSil^

This youth refrains from wrong
doings only because he
(she) is afraid of being punished.

not at all
^.

hardly

hardly

somewhat

^iUti

extremely

The actions of this youth seem to be
guided by his (her)
own standards and values.

not at all

hardly

somewhat

^[Hti

extremely

APPEI^IDIX E

Rating Scale of Attitude of Worker Toward Youth

1^3

RATING SCilL3 OF ATTITUDE OF
WOHKER TOWARD lOOTH
compared with other youths

I

have worked with.

I

feel a

ereat deal of attachment and
affection for this particular
youth.

not at all

hardly

iBSiSSt

qSiti

"

extremely

APPENDIX F
Initial Instructions to Subject Groups
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INITIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO
SUBJECT GROUPS
"This IS a study to try to
find out what opinions
and
beliefs young people In
Institutions have about certain
things. Your answers will
be held confidential and
no
one here at the school (Receiving
Center) will see your
individual responses or papers.
Please be as honest and
as serious as you possibly
can.
You will be paid ,„2.00
for participation in this study,
which will take place in
two parts.
The second part will be a week
from today and
Mill take only about ten minutes
of your time."

AFPi':NDIX G

Hotter Locus of Control (I-S) Scale

1^7
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ROTTEH LOCUS OP CONTaOL (I-E)
SCALE

DATE:

GROUP:

'^'^'"'^
^-li-^- to be the
^^^^
case as
it kTll
vnf
far as you're
concerned.
Be sure to~7 el6Gt th^ nno
you actually believe to be more true
rather thai the one you
think you should choose or the one you
would like to be true
This is a measure of personal belief:
obviously there are
no right or wrong answers.

^

In some instances you may discover that
you believe both
statements or neither one. In such cases, be
sure to select
the one you more strongly believe to be case
as far as you're
concerned. Also try to respond to each item
independently
choice; do not be influenced by your previous

choice?
1.

a.
b.

2.

a.

b.

3.

a.
b.

4.

a.

b.

5.

a.
b.

Children get into trouble because their parents
punish
them too much.
The trouble with most children nowadays is that their
parents are too easy with them.
Many of the imhappy things in people's lives are
partly due to bad luck,
People's misfortunes result from the mistakes they
make.

One of the major reasons why xire have wars is because
people don't take enough interest in politics,
There will always be wars, not matter how hard people
try to prevent them.
In the long run people get the respect they deserve
in the world.
Unfortunately, an individual's worth often passes
unrecognized no matter how hard he tries.

The idea that teachers are unfair to students is
nonsense.
Most students don't realize the extent to which their
grades are influenced by accidental happenings.
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without the right breaks
one cannot be an
effective

S^2aS^e"S?

th^eL*°p^-?-

i-r-

not

"""^

P-°P1- i-st aon.t
People who can't eret othprc? t-o t ^
stand how to .^et along
with o?hers!

ll^Tytn.

4.,

pe'rsonaL?'?-"^

they'a^e'lik:!^'^'^^^^^

determining one's
'^'^ ^^^^^^ determine what

'"^^
^-i-S to happen will
happln."'''"
Trusting to fate has never turned
out as wpIi
as^making a decision to take a
dif ini'trc^Sse'of

wellprepared student there is
"^^^
as an unfair test,
tiil/''^''
f ^'^^^S
hany times
exam questions
tend to be so unrelated
to course work that studying
is really u^^ess!
rST^!^'.!

h^^^ ^^ork; luck
^ ^^^^^^
har?i^??i!
has
little to do with it.
Getting a good job depends mainly on
being in the
right place at the right time.

The average citizen can have an
influence in b'jvern
government decisions.
This world is run by the few people in
power, and
there is not much the little suy can do
about it.
l/hen I make plans, I am almost
certain that I can
make them work.
It Is not always wise to plan too far
ahead because
many things turn out to be a matter of good or
bad
fortune anyhow.

There are certain people who are just no good.
There is some good in everybody.
In my case getting what I want has little or nothinc;
to do with luck.
Many times we might just as well decide what to do
by flipping a coin.
Who gets to be the boss often defends on who was
lucky enough to be in the right place first.
Getting people to do the right thing depends UDon
ability; luck has little or nothing to do with' it.
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forces we can neither
understand

nor control

18.
b.

19.

a.
b.

"
ihere really is no such thing
as "luck!"
One should always be willing
to admit
mistakes
It is usually best to
cover" up one s mistakes!
•

^'

^^"'^"^

Ukes vo^!

P^rsoHoh^e''
b.

^*

23.

really

'""^ '^^^"'^

a

^^^"Ss that happen to us
are balanced by the good ones.
Most misfortunes are the result of
lack of aoiiir/,
ability
Ignorance, laziness, or all three.

tlS.^''^"^^

^^^^""^

^^'^

^^^^

^^l^^^^^l

^*

^"^'^
^^^e much control over
ii^ ^^u?^^^^''''?-^
the
things politicians do In office.

a.

Sometimes I can't understand how teachers
arrive
at the grades they give,
There Is a direct connection between how
hard I
study and the grades I get.

b.

24.

^

a.
b.

A good leader expects people to decide for
themselves
what they should do.
A good leader makes It clear to everybody what their
jobs are.

25.

a.
b.

26.

a.

b.

27.

a.
b.

28.

a.
b.

Many times I feel that I have little Influence over
the things that happen to me.
It is impossible for me to believe that chance or
luck plays an important role in my life,

People are lonely because they don't try to be
friendly.
There's not much use in trying too hard to please
people; if they like you, they like you.

There is too much emphasis on athletics in high school,
Team sports are an excellent way to build character.
happens to me is my om doing.
Sometimes I feel that I don't have enough control
over the direction my life is taking.
Vihat
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l2lt\ll\TtZyTo?
In

politicians
the long run the people are rp^-nnncivn
^
government on a natlLa?
,

.sTeX^.Tonl'loHl

I'fvel,

APPENDIX H

Mosher Guilt Scale
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KOSHER GUILT SCALH

——

Name ~

Age

questionnaire consists of a number of
c-h^-h
statements
or opinions which have been given hv pairs of
coIiLp m^n
in response to the "Kosher Incomplete
"
Sentences
^est
?h2se
men were asked to complete phrases such
as .^mLTtkl T'^'
^^^^
^'^^^
to make
if
which
expressed their real feelings about the a sentencf?his
questionnaire consists of the stems to which stem
they
re
s^Snded
and a pair of their responses which
are letter^^ A

^

*

•

•

•

I^H?

^^^^
the pair of completions and
^ith or which is most characteS?
is^ic'of
istic
von
''^'K^r^^
of you.
Your
choice, in each instance, should be in
believe, how you feel, or how you would
^^y?^
lllTt and not in terms of how you
react,
think you should believe
feel, or respond.
This is not a test. There are no tllht
or wrong answers. Your choices should be a
descriDtion'of
your own personal beliefs, feelings, or reactions.'
A

a/^^T^?

^^^"^

f

Instances you may discover that you believe
4.T_
both
completions or neither completion to be characteristic
of you.
In such cases select the one you more strongly
believe to be the case as far as you are concerned. ~Se
sure
answer for every choice. Do not omit an item even
^^^.^
lu
though it is very difficult for you to decide. Just select
the more characteristic member of the pair. Encircle the
letter. A or B. whichever you most agree with.

When
A.
3.

I tell a lie . .
it hurts.
I make it a good one.

To kill in war ...
is a job to be done.
is a shame but sometimes a
necessity.

A.
B.

iJomen who curse

A.

,

,

are normal.
make me sick.

B.

punish myself .
for the evil I do.
very seldom for other people do it
for me.
Obscene literature .
A.
is sinful and a corrupt business.
B.
is fascinating reading.
I

.

.

A.
B.

.

I

.

detest myself for
my sins and failures.
for not having more exciting sexual
experiences
.

.

A.
B.

.

punish myself ...
never.
B.
by feeling nervous and depressed.
I

A.

When
A.
E.

I tell a lie
I'm angry with myself.
I mix it with truth and serve it
like a Kartini
.

.

.

One should not
.
knowingly sin.
B.
try to follow absolutes.
.

.

A.

detest myself for
.
A.
nothing, I love life.
B.
not being more nearly perfect.
I

.

.

Obscene literature
.
.
should be freely published.
B.
helps people become sexual perverts.
.

A.

I

A.
B,

regret
.
.
my sexual experiences.
nothing I've ever done.
.

A guilty conscience
A.
B.

.

.

.

does not bother me too much.
is worse than a sickness to me.

1^.

I

regret

Uhen

17.

I

.

.

ray

1/hen I

b!

19.

.

tell a lie
.
conscience bothers me
I wonder whether I'll
gei away with it.
v;hen caught in the act
A.
I try to bluff my way'out.
truth is the best policy.
3.
A.
B.

16.

.

caught, but nothing else,
f??^^5'^
all
of my sins.

B*
a.

15.

,

tell a lie

l\ell'a

^^^^P^^^^'^^ ^^^her an odd occurrence.

Sin and failure. . .
are two situations we try to
avoid
B.
do not despress me for long.

A.

20.

If I robbed a bank . .
A.
I would live like a'king.
B.
I should get caught.

21.

Sin and failure
.
A.
are the works of the Devil.
B.
have not bothered me yet.

22.

.

.

tried to make amends
,
for all my misdeeds, but I can't forget
them.
B.
but not if I could help it.
I

.

.

A.

23.

detest myself for .
.
nothing, and only rarely dislike myself.
B,
thoughts 1 sometimes have.
I

.

A.

2k,

Arguments leave me feeling
satisfied usually.
B.
exhausted.

.

.

.

A.

25.

When someone swears at me
I swear back.
it usually bothers me even if
.

A,
3.

.

.

I

don't show it.

APPENDIX

I

Hunt Paragraph Completion Measure and Instruct!
(Cognitive Complexity)
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PARAGRAPH COKPLKTION MEASURS
AND

INS'

(COGNITIVE COMPLEXITY)

Name

~~

—

_

^-ale

Female

Grade in school

^^^^^ ^^^ee

sentences on each topic.

""^^^^ °^ ^'^^^^^^ answers, so ;rive your
n.m J^^""^
""J^
own
ideas and
opinions about each toDic
Indfllt/^^l
you reanz feel about each topic,
not ?he way owners
others feel
felT
or the way you think you should

feel.

You will have about

3

minutes for each page.

Please wait for the signal to go to a new
page.
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1.

V/hat I

think about rules

Try to write at least three sentences on this topic.

WAIT FOR

SIGNilL.

TO TURN PAGE

159

2.

When

I

am criticized

.

Try to write at least three sentences on this topic.

miT

FOR SIGNAL TO

TURII

PAGE

l6o

3.

What

I

think about parents

.

Try to write at least three sentences on this topic.
WAIT FOR SIGNAL TO

TUiWi

PAGE

161

^.

l/hen

someone disagrees with me

Try to write at least three sentences on this topic.
WAIT FOR SIGNAL TO

TUIilT

PAGE

162

5.

V/hen I arc

not sure

.

.

,

Try to write at least three sentences on this topic
WAIT FOR SIGNAL TO TUBN PAGE
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6,

When

I

am told what to do

.

Try to write at least three sentences on this topic.

AFPEI\!DIX J

Feather Choice-of-Prizes Test and Instructl

:
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FaiTEEH CH0ICE-0F-PE1,SS
TEST Aim ISSTHUCTIOHS

At the end of the first
session each subject was
individually called Into an
office and given a card
of
the followin;? description:

^^--^^i^-^^

First Week:
Second

i/eek:

Total

:i

SECOND CHQTn g
'

7^
<^

2^
.jl
-L'^p

>^

.

32.00

—

First^

..

l/eek:

o
Second
Week:

Total

}

.25

^2.00
;^i2.25

Instructions
"You probably remember being
told that you will be
paid for helping out with this
study. That is true but I
am going to pay you in two parts
rather than all at once.
I want you to look at this
card and decide how you want to
be paid. You will notice that
you have two choices. The
first choice is to take ;:i.75 right
now and get a. 25 next
week, when I see you again, for a
total of ;i;2.00. The
second choice is to take $.25 right now
and :52.00 next week,
for a total of :^2.25. ivhich choice do
you want?"

AFFEITDIX K

Instructions for the Porteus Mazes
Test
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INSTHUCTIONS

POP.

THE POHTEUS MAZES TSST

"This is what is called a maze
and you must draw with
your pencil like this."
(S^a^iner takes the pencil a^d
draws about I.5 inches of the course
from the starting
arrow near the rat to around the first
turn.)
"These
lines are all supposed to be walls and
this rat went in
here (Indicating arrow) to try and get
some cheese."
(Point to cheese at end of maze.)
"Now I want you to draw
a line showing me where the rat x^ent
to find the cheese.
But you must be very careful not to cross
any lines or to
go into any place that is blocked at the
other
end.

If

you go into any blocked place, you cannot turn
around and
come out. You must start all over again with
a new maze.
One more thing you must remember— this is not a
speed
test and you

caji

stop anywhere and look as long as you like

while you decide which way to go, but try not to lift your
pencil off the paper until you are right outside the maze.
Start as soon as you are ready."

Testing is continued until all the designs of a series
have been successfully worked through within the

number of trials.

allox-jable

At any point v/here a subject draws

through an imaginary line across the entrance to a blind
street or alley, the design is removed and an "unsuccessful
trial," not a failure, is recorded.

Failure is recorded

only if this takes place after the nmnber of trials allowed
in the rules has occurred

— two

in each test design up to and

including Year XI, four in the XII, XIV, and Adult mazes.
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Testing and scoring normally
cease after three failures
anyWhere In the series have been
recorded,
or two successive

failures in Year XI or above.

APPENDIX L
Summary of Original and Partial
Correlation Coefficients
of I-Level with Dependent Variables
with

Age, Sex, and Ethnic Background Removed
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SUMARY

OF ORIGINAL AND PARTIAL
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
OF I-LSVSL WITH DEPET^DENT

VARIABLES WITH

AGE, SEX. Al^D ETHNIC BACKGROUND
REMOVED

Dependent Variable.^
1.

Verbal I. Q.

Orljri>i«i
^rip:inal

(WISC)

(^
(Age,

^^^^^^^
Sex, Race)

.58

.ii,5

(WISC)

.53

.^1

3.

Locus of Control (Rotter)

-.15

_ 22

^.

Internalized Guilt

O'^

no
-02

2.

Performance

I.

Q,

(Kosher)
5.

CoRTiltive Complexity
(Hunt)

.50

ur.

6.

Foresight (Forteus T. Q.)

.32

23

7.

Impulse Control
(Forteus Q)

-37
. '^^

"-^^

8.

Delay of Gratification
(Feather)

I',

^n

9.

Rated Locus of Control

-.4-0

-.33

10.

11.

Rated Cognitive
Complexity

Rated Internalized Guilt

1^2
*

'

.28

,20

APPENDIX M
Jane Loevinger on Factor Analysis and Personality
research
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s

172

JAME tOEVINGEH ON FACTOR
ANALYSIS AND PERSONALITY
HESEAHCH

It is important to note that
precisely th^
^^-^
between
virL'S?"'""
milestone sequences, is one
^^^u^^'''^
to which
factor analysis is blind
begin by taking as our quantitative if we
separate aspects of several stares variables
of the ego
''^^^
computational
mlS^u.
lation hf however
r"''
high speed a machine will sort
them out to reconstruct the
conceot of ego level
presented here. A considerable
have arrived at some version of number of people
this conceDt
People
Without'
c~e?r^*'^"'j.
computers
have discovered this conceDt,
but
not those using computers.)
if we are operating
®
in such studies with a series
of quantitative
measures of ego milestones, one wSuld
exDect a
melange of low and curvilinear
relationslpreclsely what is usually observed.
i'/ith respect to ego level,
it 'seems to be
the case that those manifestations
observable
at a minimal inferential level are
just the
milestones, while the polar aspects, DroDerly
treated as quajititative are only inferable
directly from patterns of observed behavior
Thus the ultra-behavlorist is doomed to
deal
trivialities in the personality field, for he in
approaches the area with a predilection at once
for observing behavior at a minimal inferential
level and for quantitative variables. But
this
is a contradiction; what can be observed most
directly are the milestones rather than the
quantitative aspects. This is the behaviorlst
dilemma, and a possible explanation for much
of the frustration and confusion that have
beset personality measurement (I966, p. 20^).
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APPENDIX K

Description of the Seven Levels of I-Level Theory
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DESCRIPTION OF THE SEVEN LEVELS OF
I-LEVLX THEORY

At this level the discrimination
of differences betwe en
self and non-self occurs. As an
infant, there is little
awareness of differences between
self and the world, but
the child gradually becomes aware
as he or she cannot
reduce tension without interactions
with things or people
outside him or herself. This differentiation
is a gross
one with people and objects seen as
relievers of tension.
An adult operatin.'^ at this level would
appear to act as if
he or she were the whole world. Basically
this would be
a rather schizoid adjustment in the sense
that it takes
gross distortions of reality to maintain
this concept of
self.

The level

1

individual is non- comprehending of

environmental influences and his or her role in them.

^evel_2

:

The Integrat io n of Monself Difference s

The differentiation of the environment into persons
and objects occurs at this level, with some appreciation
of the characteristics of each.

Kavinn; become aware of

the distinction of self and nonself

,

the developing

personality becomes concerned with the problem of how to
handle the rest of the world.

At this primitive level

of differentiation, response value Is still closely linked

in the child's mind with the stimulus value of objects.

Through a procedure of trial and error, she finds those
who meet her particular needs, and people are seen in terms

.
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of Whether they are "givers"
or "deniers."

An adult operating

at Level 2 faces life with
apparent trust, expecting the
world to be composed of givers
and functioning fairly well
as long as this is true.
In his or her need to master
objects
and people, he or she frequently
falls into crude, transparent

attempts at manipulation.

The typical response to denial

or even slight pressure is "flight
or fight."

The Level

2

person has poor capacity to explain,
understand, or predict
the behavior or reactions of others.
Ke or she is not

interested in things outside himself except
as a source of
supply. He or she behaves impulsively,
unaware of anything
except the grossest effects of his behavior
on others
(v;arren.

Level

3

I967)

:

Level

Ihe^tegrajl on
3

of aules

Includes the perception of rules or formulae

governing the relationships

betx>reen

people and objects with

a beginning aviareness of potential for complex manipulation.

Now the child begins to find relationships more complex.
This discovery Is initiated by contact with the formulae or

expectancies governing the relationships between people
and objects.

Not only must he or she be in contact with

someone in order to meet satisfactions, but that necessary

person must also be able to have the power to do this.

The

child Is taught both explicitly and Implicitly that definite
rules govern the relationships between people and objects,
and that these rules seem to control "big" people.

An

adult operating at this level is ruled by the premise that
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the world is a series of
rigidly organized, rule-bound
relationships, and is concerned
with what he or she must
do so that he or she can
make people respond positively.

More than the 1-2. the 1-3
person does understand that
his
or her o.m behavior has something
to do with whether or not
he or She gets what he or she
wants.
This person does not
operate from an internalized value
system but rather seeks
external structure in terms of
rules and formulas for
operation. His or her understanding
of formulas
is

indiscriminate and oversimplified.

The 1-3 person perceives

the world and his or her part in
it on a power dimension.
Although he can learn to play a few
stereotyped roles, he
cannot understand many of the needs,
feelings, and motives
of another person who is different
from himself. He is
unmotivated to achieve in a long-range
sense, or to plan
for the future (..-arren, I967). Many of these
features

contribute to his inability to accurately
predict the
response of others to him.

li^Ut'

The Inte.'^ration of Conflict and

7?^.<.nnn.c;o

At this level the perception of the influence
and

psychological force of others occurs.

The child is now

prepared to see himself in new, more objective terms.

His

behavior is primarily influenced by his own needs, but he
is also aware of the influence of others and of their

expectations of him.

At this point, social anxiety begins

to emerge as a motivating force.

He may assume the

attitudes characterizing another person or may use the
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gestures another uses, and others
respond to these gestures
and attitudes.
Hole-playlng is a safe kind of
practicing.
leading to a greater differentiation
and social Interaction.
Having globally accepted what
others feel as being right and
™ong. the Child is caught In the
conflict of wanting to be
like significant others, and
wanting to give expression
to his ovm needs.
Further ber-^^nc^o
.uxu.ier,
r>-p
oecause of
hiso oxm participation
in the roles, some internalization
has taken
place, and

when he fails to live up to these new
standards, he feels
guilty and self -critical
The adult i^o functions at this
level is often plagued by anxiety and
guilt regarding his
global concepts of' good and bad. He
frequently
.

finds

himself in conflict situations because he
is caught between
two incompatible ideals or goals, both
of which seem equally
important. lie is said to closely resemble the
"authoritarianpersonality; he is rather tense, suspicious,
beirtldered.

sometimes hostile, and always anxious— a person
caught in
a struggle x^ith new and socially determined feelings

of guilt.

^evel

5

:

The Integration o f Continuity

At this level is found the perception of stable action

patterns in self and others.

As the person begins to solve

some of the conflicts inherent in the very roles he has taken
over, he begins to perceive patterns of relationships and

significant symbols identifying these relationships, and
learns about distinctions obtaining in his own society.

He

becomes aware of continuity in his ovm life and in the lives
of others,

sensing a relationship in this continuity betx^een
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response In the past and response
in the present a^d future.
For the first time there is a
noticeable appreciation for
others as unit personalities and an
understanding of what
they do and feel. He begins to
perceive others as complex,
flexible people who ca.nnot be dealt xvith
on the basis of

a few simple rule-of -thumb procedures,

/m adult operating

at this level is free from some of
the problems of an overly

tense identification, and can deal with
others without being
submerged in them. He can enjoy people,
be stimulated by
them, and respond to them as individuals.

He is not overly

concerned by the fact that people change.

He may be bothered

by the incompatibility of the roles he
plays, he may feel

diffuse, wondering which of his roles is basic—
which is the
"real m.e."

Level

6

:

The Interaction of Self-Conslstencj;

At this level the perception of differences between
oneself and the social roles which one may play momentarily
is found.

The Level

6

person perceives that he need not

become the role, but rather he may carry the role as a node
of response.

Roles are defined at this stage in terms of

relationships and interactions with others.

The self is

viewed as distinct and separate from any specific relationship with others.

It Involves intra- action.

An adult at

this level is relatively stable himself, and sees others
as enduring, stable persons, since he Imows the individual

is more than his various roles and shifting behavior.

A

person f unctioning at this level may have situationally Induced
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anxiety concerning the welfare
of himself and others, but
the
adjustive capacity inherent in this
integration would almost
preclude delinquent or criminal
behavior.

LevelJ:

^iie_Int^2rat^n

j)f^

Here perception of integrating
processes in self a^id
others occurs. At Level 7 the person
is not only aware of
self and roles, but begins to
comprehend focusing on integrating processes in himself and others.
He sees a variety
of

ways of perceiving and integrating,
some of which lead to
more adequate expectations and hypotheses
than others. This
development greatly enhances his capacity for
understanding
and dealing with people who may be functioning
at integration
levels other than his oim. Probably no one
completes this

stage in today's society.

(Adapted from Sullivan, Grant and Grant, 1957.)
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TABLE OF HAN SCORES
In the table on the follo.^ng
pages, the numbered
variables represent the following:
1.

Verbal I.Q.

2.

Performance I.Q.

3.

Locus of Control (Hotter I-e
Scale)

^.

Internalized Guilt (Kosher Guilt
Scale)

5.

Cop:nltlve Complexity (Hunt CC
I-'easure)

6.

Poreslght (Porteus TQ)

7.

Impulse Control (Porteus

^*

Testf

(WISC)
(WISC)

Q)

°^ Gratification (Feather's Cholce-of-Prlzes

9.

Rated Locus of Control (Behavioral I-E
Rating)

10.

Rated Internalized Guilt (Behavioral IG
Rating

11.

)

Rated Cognitive Complexity (Behavioral CC
Rating)
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